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The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice

O'Connor
The appointment of Sandra Day O'Connor to the United
States Supreme Court in 1981 generated unusually widespread interest and provoked much speculation about the probable direction of her jurispruaience. Justice O'Connor came to the Court with
considerable experience in the three branches of Arizona state government-as assistant attorney general, as senate majority leader,
and as both trial and appellate judge. Much speculation focused on
the influence that this experience might have on her approach to
federal statutory and constitutional law.
There was also considerable anticipation about the impact
that President Reagan's first appointee might have in shifting the
Court in a more "conservative" direction. But judicial conservatism is an ambiguous concept, which may imply an emphasis on
reaching certain substantive results or an emphasis on a restrained
procedural approach to deciding cases. A question inevitably arises
about how far a "conservative" Justice may be willing or able to
alter trends in constitutional jurisprudence.
At this time, with Justice O'Connor having completed three
terms on the Court, it is appropriate to consider her emerging jurisprudence. This comment presents an analysis of the Justice's
written opinions-majority, concurring, and dissenting-during
her brief tenure on the Court.' By identifying and explaining the
recurring themes in her judicial approach, the comment offers
some suggestions about the mark she has made and will continue
to make on the Court.
Part I considers Justice O'Connor's approach to the institutional role of the Supreme Court. Although this subject might have
an insignificant place in an analysis of the work of many judges, it

'

For a statistical tabulation of Justice O'Connor's voting record on the Court, see each

year's November issue of the Harvard Law Review. The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98
HARV. L. REv. 1, 307-10 (1984); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV L. REV. 1, 295-98
(1983); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HA~v. L. R.v. 1, 304-07 (1982). Analysis of a
Justice's voting record, which concentrates on the results reached in cases, is certainly informative, but its usefulness is limited. For example, a bare statistical analysis offers little
insight into the substance of Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence-that is, the reasoning that
she uses to reach and explain her votes. This comment examines her jurisprudence rather
than the Justice herself. That is, it does not attempt to explain her positions in terms of her
"preferences," be they real or supposed. Instead, it focuses on the opinions that she has
produced in her first three terms in order to suggest how their general themes might affect
the Court's jurisprudence.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[52:389

is worth examining carefully in this instance. Justice O'Connor
urges a more restrained role for the Court, and the central theme
of this discussion is her concern with limiting the judiciary's interference with the functioning of the coordinate branches of the federal government.
Part II examines the Justice's views on federalism, an issue
that caused great difficulty at the Constitutional Convention and
about which there has never been a satisfactory consensus. Justice
O'Connor's efforts in this area are marked by an attempt to erect
defensive protections for state governmental functions.
Part III focuses on Justice O'Connor's view of constitutional
protections extended to individuals. Justice O'Connor's approach
here mirrors the themes that emerge in the first two parts: again,
she seeks to protect government purposes and operations-especially those of the states-against extensive regulation by the
courts. In assessing the balance between individual rights and government interests, she displays a special solicitude for the latter.

I.

THE ROLE OF THE COURT

When a case arrives before the Supreme Court, each Justice
must consider two very different kinds of issues. Each case raises
substantive legal questions. But these substantive legal questions
are immersed in a particular procedural history. The tendency of a
Justice to emphasize more frequently one or the other of these aspects of a case may reflect that Justice's views about the role of the
Court. By emphasizing substantive legal questions over procedural
factors, a Justice may manifest an aggressive desire for the Court
to express judgments on the substantive legal questions involved.
When a Justice emphasizes the procedural setting of a case, however, particular substantive results may become less important.
Such an approach reflects a conviction that legal questions should
be resolved by the Court only when necessary.2
Justice O'Connor often attacks the issues in a case by attending closely to its particular procedural history.3 Her approaches to
2 Nevertheless, procedural concerns can also be invoked as a veneer to mask a Justice's
particular substantive positions and can be used to reach the desired result without having
to defend the substantive position. Thus, in inferring a Justice's views on the role of the
Court from that Justice's statements about procedural concerns, it is important that the
underlying substantive context of the particular case be examined.
I See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2591 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (reviewing the "complete procedural perspective" of the case in
order to clarify the Court's decision); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 302 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (rejecting an argument
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stare decisis and statutory construction also reflect some adherence
to traditional limitations on judicial conduct. Nonetheless, a closer
examination of these two issues raises questions about how consistently Justice O'Connor adheres to this position and how much she
actually differs in this respect from other Justices.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor sometimes goes beyond traditional constraints. Her attention to the procedural posture of a
case is not limited to its legal context; she also pays close attention
to its political context, or its "posture" within the constitutional
system. She is especially careful, in examining a case, to note the
pertinent responsibilities of officials in other branches and levels of
government. She then draws inferences from those responsibilities
that limit the scope of judicial power.4 This approach transcends
traditional judicial restraint: not only should the Court avoid ruling on substantive legal issues where possible, but the Court
should also interpret these issues, and the Constitution itself, so as
to limit judicial intrusions upon the coordinate branches of government. This position denies that the Court's role should be shaped
merely by its responsibility to protect individual rights. Instead,
the Court must also respect the democratic exercise of the power
to govern. According to this view, that power is reposed primarily
in the politically responsible branches of government and must not
5
be unduly hindered by the aggressive exercise of judicial power.
Justice O'Connor's approach takes shape as an interesting and
sometimes paradoxical blend of statements that support both ordinary judicial restraint and attempts to set out more radical limitations on the judicial role. Indeed, at times she takes "activist" posiabout standing that "ignores the procedural posture" of the case).
4 A good example of this approach is Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 921 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), where she rejected a first amendment challenge to a school
board's removal of nine books from its curriculum and its libraries by emphasizing the
broad scope of the board's responsibilities.
5 Consider the following statement by Justice Douglas on this controversy:
There has long been a school of thought here that the less the judiciary does, the
better. It is often said that judicial intrusion should be infrequent, since it is "always
attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes
from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and
correcting their own errors."
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 110 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting JAMES THAYER,
JOHN MARSHALL 106 (1901)). Justice Douglas then stated his opposing view, emphasizing
that the federal judiciary is designed to play an important role in "guarding basic rights
against majoritarian control," often as "the one and only place where effective relief can be
obtained." 392 U.S. at 110-11. For further discussion of the tension between individual
rights and a majoritarian view of government, see infra text following note 207.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[52:389

tions in order to limit the scope of judicial power over the rest of
the government. These two aspects of her position will be considered in turn.
A.

"Traditional" Judicial Restraint

Restraint is a common theme in Justice O'Connor's statements about the judicial role. She often writes pointed concurring
opinions that narrow the Court's holding.6 She protests when the
Court resolves issues that she thinks are not properly before it 7
and when the Court reaches issues that are not necessary, in her
view, to dispose of the case.8 Moreover, she emphasizes that courtroom confrontations are not the sole way, and often not the best
way, to resolve disputes.9 Other aspects of her jurisprudence, however, are more telling about the precise contours of her view of judicial restraint.
1. Stare Decisis. A significant illustration of Justice
O'Connor's views on judicial restraint is her approach to the principle of stare decisis. She sometimes expresses reluctance to disturb prior decisions with which she disagrees, especially where ordinary practice has conformed to those pronouncements."0
Nonetheless, this reluctance typically does not prevent her from
e See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2536 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (summarizing the Court's holding as comprising only three "well-settled propositions"); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 611 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (agreeing that the first amendment protects the right of press and public to
attend criminal trials, but rejecting any broader implications outside that context).
7 See, e.g., Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 414-15 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (joining the Court's opinion except insofar as it suggested a resolution of an
issue not presented to it); North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 323 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court for deciding an issue not properly before it
and not raised in the court below).
8 See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 655 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part) (agreeing with the Court's decision, but not joining its resolution of an issue that she
thought was unnecessary to that decision).
9 For example, she showed a strong preference for the voluntary settlement of disputes
in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2593-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (involving a voluntary consent decree in a Title VII action), and in Schaefer v.
NLRB, 104 S. Ct. 362, 364 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (seeking to clarify NLRB policy that defers to private resolutions of labor disputes).
10 See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3237-38 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (construing Title VI to redress nothing more than purposeful
discrimination, but stating that she might have construed the statute differently had the
Court not already ruled on the issue in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978)); cf. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 517 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(agreeing "reluctantly" that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under section 1983, thus standing behind the Court's settled interpretation
of congressional intent even against what she considered to be sound policy).
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reaching substantive issues. A prominent example is her opinion in
New York v. Quarles.1 1
Benjamin Quarles was charged with criminal possession of a
weapon. Police had apprehended him in a supermarket because he
matched the description of a suspected rapist. In frisking him, the
police discovered an empty shoulder holster. Before giving Miranda warnings to the suspect, the police asked him where the gun
was. Quarles told them and they found the gun. The police then
read Quarles his Miranda rights before questioning him further.
The lower court ruled that neither Quarles' first statement nor the
gun was admissible as evidence because Mirandawarnings had not
been given.
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
bare majority, set out a "public safety exception" to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's statements may be admitted as evidence. The police face many situations where prompt and effective action must be taken to counter
serious threats to public safety, and the Court held that Miranda
warnings are dispensable until those threats are extinguished. 2
Justice Rehnquist frankly acknowledged the issue of stare decisis. He argued that the holding in Miranda v. Arizona" was limited primarily to a concern for the suspect's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination "in the presumptively coercive
environment of the station house."14 Yet he admitted that the
Court had not specifically limited the Miranda rule to stationhouse questioning.1 5 Justice Rehnquist also recognized that the
Court's ruling would lessen the clarity of the Miranda rule. Nonetheless, he argued that this exception would not require an "onthe-scene balancing process" and could be applied "almost instinctively" by police officers.1
Justice O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part. Although she sympathized with the substance of the Court's holding,
she emphatically disagreed with the majority's formal approach:
[T]he Court acknowledges that it is departing from prior precedent . . . and that it is "lessen[ing] the desirable clarity of
[the Miranda] rule" . . . . Were the Court writing from a
n 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
12 Id. at 2632-33.
13 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14 104 S. Ct. at 2632 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455-58).
See 104 S. Ct. at 2631 n.4 (citing cases).
1 Id. at 2633.
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clean slate, I could agree with its holding. But Miranda is now
the law and, in my view, the Court has not provided sufficient
justification for departing from it or for blurring its now clear
strictures. 7
In assessing the Court's many pronouncements on the Miranda
rule, Justice O'Connor stressed its durability and claiity. 18 The
balance between individual rights and effective law enforcement is
inevitably precarious, and a kind of equilibrium had been achieved
following Miranda. The burden of securing public safety without
infringing Miranda rights had been squarely placed upon the state
government, and law enforcement officials had adjusted to the rule.
Thus, she found no justification for the Court to upset this "equilibrium" for "a fine-spun new doctrine on public safety exigencies
incident to custodial interrogation, complete with the hair-splitting
distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."' 19 For example, after Quarles there could be substantial
dispute over the meaning of "public safety."
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court's substantive attempt to limit the scope of Miranda. Indeed, she went
further. Her approach would have softened the state's
prosecutorial burden by distinguishing testimonial evidence from
non-testimonial evidence and admitting at trial the non-testimonial fruits of a Miranda violation. 20 Hence, in Quarles she would
have excluded the initial statement but allowed the gun as evidence. Ironically, this proposal led Justice Marshall to criticize her
for the same fault she had found with Justice Rehnquist: departure
from precedent. Justice Marshall's dissent pointed to a line of
cases that support a "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which
would exclude incriminating evidence, particularly physical evi-

17

Id.

at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations

omitted).
'8 This emphasis on the need for the Court to provide clear rules'is a recurrent theme
in Justice O'Connor's opinions. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3474-76 (1983)
(offering clearer guidance on when the Supreme Court will not review a state court decision
because it rests on an "adequate and independent state ground"); City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 454 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(suggesting a new approach to reviewing abortion laws, which would replace the Court's
increasingly blurry trimester framework); see also cases cited infra note 49.
19 104 S. Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20 Id. at 2634, 2637-41. Justice O'Connor's position here is consistent with her general
approach to resolving the balance between individual rights and state interests. For a more
detailed consideration of her views on the exclusionary rule, see infra notes 242-56 and accompanying text.
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dence, that was illegally obtained.2 1
Justice Marshall's criticism and Justice O'Connor's response2 2
help clarify her position on stare decisis. There is a crucial difference between Justice Rehnquist's approach in Quarles and her
own. Justice Rehnquist openly deviated from precedent in order to
erect an exception to the established Miranda rule. Justice
O'Connor, however, found a gap between competing lines of precedent. Against the doctrine noted by Justice Marshall, she cited another quite different line of cases, beginning with Schmerber v.
2 3 In these
California.
cases, the Court had refused to use the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination to suppress nontestimonial evidence obtained outside the courtroom. 2 4 She then
pointed to Michigan v. Tucker 25 to show that the Court had left
open the question of whether physical evidence obtained in violation of Miranda would be admissible. Finally, she argued that the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine had been limited in application to infringements of "core" constitutional rights that safeguard
the adversary system of justice, not to the prophylactic Miranda
standards.26
Justice O'Connor's approach, characterized by Justice Marshall as a "radical departure from precedent, ' 27 can be reconciled
21 104 S. Ct. at 2649-50 & n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting). An early statement of this
view was given by Justice Holmes in a fourth amendment case. See Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920). Justice Marshall also cited Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), to show that the rule had been expanded to cover violations of
the fifth and sixth amendments.
22 104 S. Ct. at 2640 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
connection with this discussion, note Justice Marshall's brief criticism of Justice O'Connor
for deciding an issue not properly before the Court, id. at 2649 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and her brief discussion of that same issue, id. at 2637 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
2- 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (decided one week after Miranda). For a discussion of these
cases, see Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2637-39 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
"2 See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1967) (accused required to provide handwriting sample); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967) (accused required to stand in a lineup and speak on cue).
25 417 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1974) (involving the use of testimony of witness discovered by
police as a result of statement by defendant). Tucker involved facts arising before Miranda
was decided, but the Court's ruling was said to be consistent with the exclusionary rule as
applied to Miranda violations. Id. at 444-46.
26 104 S. Ct. at 2640 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus,
Justice O'Connor distinguished between a situation, as in Quarles, where the police merely
failed to give Miranda warnings, and situations where a suspect had been compelled to
speak by abusive police practices. In the latter circumstances, she would apply the broader
exclusionary rule. Id. at 2639-40.
7 Id. at 2649 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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with adherence to stare decisis, at least on the surface. In this instance, the precedents could be regarded as conflicting. She identified one developing body of doctrine and took up its cause against
a more entrenched but antithetical body of doctrine. To do so is an
inevitable part of the judicial function, understood as a process
that moves in fits and starts to clarify the content and extent of
guiding legal principles.2" Although one might reject the analogy
she made to this differing line of precedent, her approach does differ from creating a new and uncertain exception to a clear and durable rule, which she refused to do without "a clean slate."29
The importance of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Quarles is
her refusal to overturn a precedent with which she disagreed. The
nature of Justice O'Connor's restraint is ambiguous here, however,
because she was able to reach a similar substantive result in her
concurrence. Although less testimonial evidence would be admissible under her approach than under the Court's approach, much
more non-testimonial evidence would be admissible at trial, thus
limiting the bite of the exclusionary rule. Her notion of restraint in
Quarles was compatible with change; its effect was not so much on
the result as on how the result was achieved. Yet, because she
achieved part of the desired result by another avenue, her invocation of stare decisis was perhaps of less significance.
In Quarles, Justice O'Connor did not find "sufficient justification" to depart from the principle of stare decisis.3 0 She offered
some guidance as to what constitutes "sufficient justification" in
her vigorous dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,3 1 one of three companion cases in which the
Court reviewed state and local abortion regulations.2 The Court

28

Justice O'Connor's use of Schmerber and its progeny is an attempt to bring together

different but possibly analogous lines of precedent. As Judge Cardozo noted: "Rules appropriate to spheres which are conceived of as separate and distinct cannot both be enforced
when the spheres become concentric. There must then be readjustment or collision." Hynes
v. New York Cent. R.R., 231 N.Y. 229, 236, 131 N.E. 898, 900 (1921). The question raised by
this attempt is whether the analogy she offered between these two lines of precedent is
persuasive. For a discussion of this understanding of judicial practice, see generally EDWARD

LEvi,

AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING passim (1949).
2-9104 S. Ct. at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice

O'Connor made a similar attempt to apply one line of cases to a situation in which they had
previously been thought inapposite in United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983) (extending rationale for permissible search without probable cause to seizure of property without probable cause); see infra notes 211-25 and accompanying text.
20 104 S. Ct. at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
:1 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
22 The other cases were Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983), and Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
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expressly reaffirmed its ten-year-old decision in Roe v. Wade, 33
which established a trimester analysis for determining the permissible scope of abortion laws. This analysis provided, in part, that a
woman's right to privacy encompasses the right to decide whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester and
that the state may not prescribe regulations that impose any significant burden on a woman's exercise of her right during that period. Applying this standard in Akron, the Court invalidated the
particular ordinance at issue.34
Although agreeing with the Court that stare decisis is one of
the most fundamental judicial principles, Justice O'Connor
pointed to past decisions that applied the principle less rigidly in
constitutional cases, especially when the Court was "convinced of
former error." 35 She urged the Court to take a sweeping step and
reject the trimester analysis established in Roe because, in her
view, it "is a completely unworkable method of accommodating the
conflicting personal rights and compelling state interests that are
involved in the abortion context. '3 6 She especially disagreed with
the broad scope of a woman's privacy right during the first
trimester.
Justice O'Connor presented two different kinds of arguments
against the Court's approach to the abortion issue. In her first attack, she argued that Roe itself had been wrongly decided: the imposition of the trimester framework was based on an underestimation of the state interests involved. One of the postulates of Roe
was that although the state has a legitimate interest in potential
life, this interest becomes compelling only after the fetus reaches
viability. Once this point has been reached, the state's compelling
interest will support even a total ban on abortions.3 Justice
33 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Akron, 462 U.S. at 420 & n.1.
3

462 U.S. at 452.

35 Id. at 458-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,

665 (1944)); cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("all constitutional questions are always open"); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (principle of stare decisis is more limited in constitutional cases because "[t]he ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the
Constitution itself, and not what we have said about it").
36 462 U.S. at 454 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. Justice O'Connor also criticized Roe's holding that the
state's interest in maternal health becomes compelling only after the first trimester. As with
the state's interest in potential life, she argued that this interest is compelling throughout
the pregnancy. Akron, 462 U.S. at 460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Although acceptance of
this proposition would make serious inroads on the constitutional right created by Roe, it
would not necessarily justify a total ban on abortions: Roe had held that the state's compelling interest in maternal health only justifies the regulation of abortions. Roe, 410 U.S. at
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O'Connor criticized the "viability" line as artificial. There was no
real justification for concluding that a state's interest in protecting
potential human life becomes compelling only at viability: "At any
' 38 Comstage in pregnancy, there is the potential for human life.
bined with Roe's holding that the state's compelling interest in potential life would allow a state to prohibit all abortions, this would
lay the groundwork for a complete evisceration of the restraints
that Roe placed upon the states.
Justice O'Connor's other argument for rejecting Roe was that,
quite apart from whether Roe was wrongly decided, its trimester
approach to abortion cases had become indefensible and unworkable. This conclusion was based on three major criticisms. First,
the trimester lines had become blurred by advances in medical
technology. Those lines were drawn according to the state of medical practice in 1973. As medical practice has evolved, and continues to evolve, the underlying justifications for the trimester lines
are steadily weakened. The trimester framework provided a clear
rule, but it had become divorced from its rationale: the clear rule
was no longer defensible. As she pointed out, the Court in Akron
was willing to depart from the clear trimester lines in order to remain consistent with current medical practice.3 9 Thus, the trimester approach no longer provided state and local lawmakers with
clear guidance separating permissible from impermissible regulation.40
Second, the trimester framework required the judiciary to engage in a task for which it is not competent. Roe required courts to
function as "the Nation's 'ex officio medical board,' ,,41 constantly
revising putative constitutional standards to keep pace with
changes in medical practice. If such determinations could be made
at all, they could be made more capably by the legislative branch
42
of government.
Finally, Justice O'Connor argued that the Roe framework was
inherently self-destructive:
Just as improvements in medical technology inevitably

163.
462 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 454-55 & n.2 (citing id. at 431, 435-36).
Id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 456 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 99 (1976) (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
11 462 U.S. at 456 n.4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's statement here reflects her narrow view of the judicial function in relation to other branches of government.
For a general discussion of this subject, see infra notes 51-137 and accompanying text.
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will move forward the point at which the State may regulate
for reasons of maternal health, different technological improvements will move backward the point of viability at
which the State may proscribe abortions except when necessary to preserve the life and health of the mother.43
Many abortion regulations can be viewed as involving both of these
somewhat overlapping concerns: protection of maternal health and
protection of potential life. Thus, Justice O'Connor argued, the
very same abortion regulations may become more justifiable from
the standpoint of protecting potential life even as they become less
justifiable from the standpoint of protecting maternal health.
These contradictory trends will inevitably add further confusion to
determinations on this issue.44
In rejecting both the rationale of Roe and its trimester analysis, Justice O'Connor offered a different approach to the abortion
cases. Stressing the limited nature of the privacy right involved,
which "'cannot be said to be absolute,' ,,45 she argued from prior
cases that this right merely protects a woman from an "unduly
burdensome" interference with her decision about whether or not
to terminate pregnancy. 46 Thus, setting aside any divisions of pregnancy by trimester, she offered the following alternative to the Roe
framework: any regulation not imposing an undue burden on a woman's right to decide whether to have an abortion would require
minimal judicial scrutiny; an unduly burdensome regulation could
be upheld as justified, but only on a showing of a compelling state
interest. 47 Given Justice O'Connor's willingness to extend the reach
of the state's compelling interests, this test would permit much
broader interference by the state with a woman's abortion decision.

462 U.S. at 456-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
11 It is not clear just what to make of this argument. No necessary contradiction arises
from these opposing trends; they merely suggest that over time states will become less free
to regulate abortions for purposes of maternal health even as they become more free to
proscribe abortions altogether. So long as these justifications can be separated from one
another-that is, so long as proscription can be separated from mere regulation-these
trends do not represent a "collision course." Yet, to the extent that it is hard to separate
these justifications when examining particular regulations (e.g., regulations of maternal
health that amount to proscriptions or near-proscriptions), the opposing trends may help to
create additional confusion.
15 462 U.S. at 463 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 154).
16 See 462 U.S. at 461-65 & n.8 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She equated the phrase "unduly burdensome" with "situations involving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the
abortion decision." Id. at 464. She also favored significant but not complete deference to
legislative judgments about what would constitute an "undue burden." Id. at 461 & n.10.
47 Id. at 461-65.
13
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Thus, Justice O'Connor was willing to depart from stare decisis under the circumstances that she found to be present in Akron:
when the underlying precedent offered blurred guidance, when it
cast the judiciary in an inappropriate role, and when it contained
underlying analyses pointing in opposite directions. Even here,
however, she seemed to act out of concern for judicial restraint by
asking the Court to retreat from what she considered to be unduly
obtrusive activity under Roe. One of the primary defects of Roe, in
her view, is that it makes necessary constant revisions by the Court
of its own unjustified scientific and policy judgments. Thus, her
Akron dissent may exemplify her willingness to be "activist" in defense of judicial restraint.
Like Quarles, however, Akron offers ambiguous guidance
about the contours of Justice O'Connor's notion of restraint. On
the one hand, Akron might indicate the extreme set of circumstances that must be present before she is willing to depart from
precedent. This would be consistent with her statement that departure from stare decisis is an "exceptional action" demanding
"special justification" even in constitutional cases. 48 As her opinion
in Quarles suggests, the principle of stare decisis should outweigh a
Justice's own view that a prior decision is merely wrong, or even
very wrong; but the additional problems surrounding the Roe decision are enough to justify departure from stare decisis. On the
other hand, Akron may simply show her rejecting a case that she
thought was wrongly decided in order to reach a more desirable
substantive result. Although she presented a variety of arguments
for overturning Roe, it is not entirely clear how important or necessary each of those justifications was in leading her to that outcome.
Thus, although Quarles shows Justice O'Connor's concern for adhering faithfully even to a disagreeable precedent, Akron suggests
that she does not consider such fidelity to be the fundamental
guiding principle of her jurisprudence.4 9

48

Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984) (O'Connor, J.).

'9 Other instances where Justice O'Connor evinced less concern for ordinary aspects of

judicial restraint include United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-45 (1983) (stating, in
dicta, that "sniff tests" by dogs trained to locate narcotics are not searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment), and Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct.
1005, 1038 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Rehnquist's prediction,
id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), that the Court's decision to overrule its own tenth
amendment doctrine will itself be overruled in time).
Justice O'Connor's position on judicial restraint aside, she quite clearly expects the Supreme Court to exercise strong guiding power within the judicial system. She feels that
restraint must not lead the Court to abdicate its responsibilities as the supreme judicial
authority. Thus, one of her major themes is clarity; she often writes brief concurrences to
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2. Statutory Construction. In keeping with her views about
the limits of judicial authority, Justice O'Connor attempts to limit
judicial involvement in the task of legislation. Congress is the lawmaking body, and she generally seeks to construe statutes in a way
that narrows the range of judicial discretion. Yet the task of statutory construction presents a peculiar imbroglio of legislative and
judicial powers that has long obscured the neat partitions in the
constitutional system, leading both to the confusing and contradictory welter of judicial "rules" for statutory construction 5 and to
frequent criticism of the judiciary for usurping the legislative
power. Justice O'Connor, like most other judges, has had difficulty
here.
When Justice O'Connor examines statutory language, she typically finds guidance in the general rules that the analysis "'must
begin with the language of the statute itself,'" and that" '[a]bsent
a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' ,,51
For example,
she adopted the "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation, with a harsh result, in Immigration & NaturalizationService
v. Phinpathya.52 A Thai woman and her husband had remained in
the United States illegally after their visas had expired. In all, they
had resided here for more than seven years. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) began deportation proceedings
against the couple, who conceded that they were deportable aliens
but applied to an immigration judge for suspension of the proceed-

clarify the Court's holding. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2535-36
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (summarizing the Court's opinion as comprising only three

"well-settled" propositions); United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237, 1245 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (emphasizing a point that was "implicit" in the Court's analysis); cf. Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 73 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court for estab-

lishing "an uncertain jurisprudence" in the equal protection area). At times, she has gone
further and offered explicit instruction to a lower court on remand. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 403-05 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating one of the options open to the district court on remand); Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
364, 366 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same). She also has not hesitated to assert the
Court's responsibility to review the findings of fact made by special masters in cases falling

under the original jurisdiction of the Court. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S.Ct. 2433,
2439 (1984); Idaho ex reL. Evans v. Oregon, 103 S. Ct. 2817, 2828-29 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,

dissenting).
" See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
51

TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS

521-35 (1960).

Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982)

(quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187 (1980); Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); see also Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Phinpathya, 104 S. Ct. 584, 589 (1984) (quoting Bread, 455 U.S. at
580); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 635 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same).
52

104 S.Ct. 584 (1984).
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ings pursuant to statute. The statute allowed the proceedings to be
suspended when an alien, among other things, "has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less
than seven years."'5 3 The judge suspended proceedings against the
husband, but found that the wife did not satisfy the requirement
of "continuous" presence, since she had left the country for three
months during the seven-year period.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court agreed with the immigration judge. She understood the statute, according to its ordinary meaning, to require seven years of continuous physical presence, with no exceptions. 4 She argued that the legislative history
supported this strict reading and refused to adopt a more liberal
construction: "Congress designs the immigration laws, and it is up
to Congress to temper the laws' rigidity if it so desires." 5
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan argued that this interpretation was too harsh. In his view, the Court should apply
general terms so as to avoid "'injustice, oppression, or an absurd
consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of law in such cases should prevail over its letter.'"56 Justice Brennan feared that the Court's
reading would allow "continuous" physical presence for seven
years to be negated, for example, by a short vacation to Mexico or
an inadvertent train ride through Canada while going from Buffalo
57
to Detroit.
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Securities Industry Association
v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System58 helps to
explain her concern about statutory interpretation based on policy
judgments or judgments grounded on the spirit of the law. Briefly
stated, the statutory question was whether commercial paper was a
"security" under the Glass-Steagall Act.59 The Court held that it
was; 0 Justice O'Connor concluded that the Board of Governors of

:3

8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982).

4 104 S. Ct. at 589.

Id. at 592-93.
6 Id. at 594 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 482, 486-87 (1868)).
57 104 S. Ct. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also disagreed with the
Court's reading of the legislative history. He concurred in the judgment, however, because
he agreed that an unexplained three-month absence from the country was enough to disqualify an alien from relief from deportation. Id.
88 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984).
59Banking Act of 1933, §§ 16, 21, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378(a)(1) (1982).
60104 S. Ct. at 2981.
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the Federal Reserve System had not unreasonably decided that it
was not."' The brunt of her disagreement centered on the Court's
preoccupation with the policies of the Act:
The dangers that Congress sought to eliminate when it enacted the Glass-Steagall Act are easily stated at a level of generality that might make the Board's ruling appear inconsistent with congressional policies. The translation of policy into
legislation, however, is always complicated by the necessity of
taking into account potentially competing and overlapping
laws and policies. The task of this Court, therefore, is to interpret the statutory language that Congress enacted into law.2
This statement suggests a view that laws are the outcome of a
struggle among interests within the legislative process. That process domesticates the competing interests through compromise.
Laws emerge in their particular shape because they are molded by
that particular process. Thus, the general principles that are articulated in those struggles are less trustworthy as a guide to legislation than the actual words of statutes, which were, in the end, all
that Congress passed. As a result, the Court must not substitute
itself for Congress by unnecessarily interpreting a statute according to its putative underlying policies. As Justice O'Connor stated
in another case, "It is not the function of this Court.

.

.to apply

the finishing touches needed to perfect legislation. Our job does
not extend beyond attempting to fathom what it is that Congress
produced, blemished as the Court may perceive that creation to
be." 63 In other words, the Court has some latitude to interpret
statutory language that makes no logical sense. But the Court has
no latitude to interpret statutory language that makes no policy
64

sense.

61Id. at 3003 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

62Id. She combined the themes of judicial deference to administrative agencies and to
Congress in her strongly worded conclusion: "It is singularly inappropriate for this Court,
reasoning from the general policies it finds in the statute and with little regard for the statutory language, to reject the construction of the statute adopted by the Board after careful
consideration and with full explanation." Id.; cf. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S.
Ct. 3492, 3511 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[O]ur judicial role is simply to discern
[congressional] intent. . . . What we, if sitting as legislators, might consider wise legislative
policy is irrelevant to our task.").
13 FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 644 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 634, 641-44 & n.12. This distinction between logical sense and policy sense
seems difficult to draw, however, in any of the hard cases where one can conceive of "absurd
consequences" that rest on policy grounds. The most relevant canon of statutory construction advises that statutes should be construed so as to avoid an absurd result. See, e.g., St.
Joseph's Hosp. & Medical Center v. Maricopa County, 130 Ariz. 239, 245, 635 P.2d 527, 533
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Justice O'Connor has been criticized at times for departing
unjustifiably from this "plain meaning" approach. One such occasion arose in Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 5 where her majority opinion
came under fire from the dissent for paying insufficient attention
to plain statutory language. The Court was considering the scope
of the Comptroller General's statutory right to demand access to
records pertaining to certain government contracts. The narrow issue was to determine what records could be said to "directly pertain to, and involve transactions relating to, the contract or subcontract."6 6 Her opinion began from this language, terming it
"words of limitation designed to restrict the class of records to
which access is permitted by requiring some close connection be67
tween the type of records sought and the particular contract.
But she apparently thought that the language did not illuminate
the problem of what connection was required between the records
and the contract because she turned immediately to the legislative
history for guidance in balancing the public and private interests
at stake.6 8 Her solution, in accord with the lower court decisions,
allowed the Comptroller General access to records of direct costs
related to the contract, but denied access to records of "indirect
costs" unless the contractor had allocated them as attributable to
the particular contract. 9
In separate opinions, Justices White and Blackmun criticized
the Court for flouting the plain meaning of the statute. 70 As these
two opinions themselves found different "plain meanings," their
central criticism may be weak. 71 But they did identify a problem
with Justice O'Connor's approach, which Justice Blackmun de-

(Ct. App. 1981) (O'Connor, J.). Yet this suggestion makes no distinction between these two

kinds of "absurdity."
65 460 U.S. 824 (1983).
66 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1982). One of the four contracts was governed instead by the
language of 41 U.S.C. § 254(c) (1982), but the Court found that the slight differences in the
wording of the statutes were immaterial. 460 U.S. at 827 n.3.
67 460 U.S. at 831.
" Id. at 831-34.
"Id. at 840.
70 Id.
at 853 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 862-63 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71 Justice White agreed that the Comptroller General had the right to inspect "direct
cost" records, but would have permitted greater access to some "indirect cost" records as
well. Id. at 846-47 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun
would have held that the Comptroller General had no access even to "direct cost" records
"when the terms of a contract are not tied to costs and the contractor makes no representations about costs during its negotiations with the Government." Id. at 865 (Blackmun, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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scribed as a mere "nod in the direction of the statutory language"
that went on to overturn the "balancing" and "accommodation" of
interests already accomplished by Congress.7 2 In her defense, Justice O'Connor replied with "a well-settled canon of statutory construction that, where the language does not dictate an answer to
the problem before the Court, 'we must analyze the policies underlying the statutory provision to determine its proper scope.' ,,7Justice O'Connor may have been correct that the bare statutory language at issue in Bowsher provided no resolution of the
issue before the Court. But her analysis is problematic on two
counts. First, she reached this conclusion without carefully analyzing the ordinary meaning of the words in the statute. 4 A "plain
meaning" orientation requires an initial detailed examination of
what the statute says, and, unless it is to be used merely as a tool
for reaching convenient results, this approach must be consistently
applied. Second, while she properly noted that it is commonplace
for courts to examine underlying policies when statutory language
is unclear,7 5 this practice poses theoretical problems for someone,
like Justice O'Connor, who has expressed concern about judicial
interference in policy matters. Even when Congress has not spoken
clearly on a given topic, the dangers of judicial preemption of the
lawmaking function remain. The only added justification for policy
analysis when the statutory language is unclear comes from the
thought that some interpretation must be reached in order to decide the case. On these occasions, her concern about judicial responsibility to interpret the statute appears to override her con712Id.

at 860-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Id. at 831 n.7 (majority opinion) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 517 (1982)
(O'Connor, J.)).
74 Cf. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656, 661 (1984) (O'Connor, J.)
(also giving only a brief analysis of the statutory language). For an example of a more careful analysis, consider her approach in Commissioner v. Engle, 104 S. Ct. 597, 603-04 (1984)
(construing statutory language affecting the taxation of oil and gas producers).
7 She adopted the same approach in her dissent in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
The issue was whether and under what circumstances punitive damages were available in a
case arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Because the statute
is silent on this matter, the Court sought illumination from the common law as it existed in
1871 and concluded that punitive damages could be given where the defendant's conduct
was reckless or motivated by evil intent. 461 U.S. at 39-45. Justice Rehnquist, also referring
to the common law at the time the statute was passed, disagreed with the Court's holding.
Id. at 60 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, in a separate dissent, found this
"significant split in authority" just as uninformative as the statute itself: "The battle of the
string citations can have no winner." Id. at 93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Instead, she turned
for guidance to the policies underlying the statute.
73
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cern for judicial restraint in lawmaking. 7
Taken together, these two problems with Justice O'Connor's
approach in Bowsher and Securities Industry are especially troub-

ling. The weaknesses of a "plain meaning" approach are illustrated
in these cases by the dramatic interpretive disagreements among
the Justices." Justice O'Connor is understandably worried that the
judiciary will arbitrate among an array of policies and interests, in
usurpation of the legislative role, if courts undertake to weigh policies whenever statutory language is "unclear." But the difference
between proper judicial action and questionable judicial interference with the legislature rests on elusive insights into the ordinary
meanings of language. Because few statutes requiring interpretation by the Court are models of clarity, it is difficult to see how
Justice O'Connor's own "plain meaning" approach can adequately
allay her concern about judicial lawmaking.
B. "Activist" Judicial Restraint
Some aspects of Justice O'Connor's position on the role of the
judiciary are not confined by ordinary notions of judicial restraint.
She is concerned to preserve the integrity of the system of separated powers, and she seems to suggest that the greatest present
threat to this system has arisen from the gradual growth in federal
judicial power. Thus, she advocates narrower limits on the judicial
role and greater deference toward the powers held by coordinate
branches of the federal government.
7' For a different approach, suggesting that courts need not feel compelled to construe
statutes where there is no solid statutory basis for their interpretation, see Easterbrook,
Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary,7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984);
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 533 (1983). For a less radical critique of
common statutory canons, see Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom and in
the Courtroom, 50 U. CHL L. REv. 800 (1983).
Justice O'Connor does not object to applying certain well-established substantive judicial policies in statutory construction-for example, the rule of lenity, which requires a
higher standard for resolving facial ambiguity against a defendant when interpreting a criminal statute. See, e.g., Dixson v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1172, 1183 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). But cf. McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 658 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (refusing to apply the rule of lenity because interpretation "does not raise significant questions
of ambiguity" when a statutory term is held to carry the court's interpretation of it at the
time of enactment). Because the rule of lenity does not involve the courts in weighing competing policies to set out new law to fill gaps in the legislative scheme, it seems to pose less
danger of judicial lawmaking.
7 Even a consistent "plain meaning" approach has been the target of substantial criticism. See, e.g., HENRY FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 204-06 (1967) (discussing Justice Frankfurter's critique); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 892, 902-07 (1982).
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1. Review of Agencies and Officials. In most cases involving
review of agency decisions, Justice O'Connor follows familiar
paths. She respects agency expertise in complex, specialized fields
and is deeply skeptical of judicial competence to review agency de78
cisions in such areas. For example, in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,
her opinion for a majority of the Court upheld the NLRB's conclusions that illegal aliens were "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act"9 and that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice in reporting these aliens to the INS after they
had voted in favor of union representation. Indeed, the Court overturned the Seventh Circuit's modification of the NLRB's initial
remedies8 0 on the ground that the courts "should not substitute
their judgment for that of the Board in determining how best to
undo the effects of unfair labor practices." ' Despite her deference
to agency expertise, however, Justice O'Connor accepts the traditional understanding that the Court must not defer to the agency
when determining the scope of the agency's statutory grant of
power. In ICC v. American Trucking Associations," she objected
strongly to the majority's deference to the agency's interpretation
of the scope of its own authority. Finding that the statutory language did not support the broad power claimed by the Commission, Justice O'Connor argued that "this Court is no more author' 3
ized than is the Commission to rewrite the law."
104 S. Ct. 2803 (1984).
National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
8 104 S. Ct. at 2808 (summarizing the lower court's remedies in NLRB v. Sure-Tan,
7.
"

Inc., 672 F.2d 592, 603-06 (7th Cir. 1982)).
81 104 S. Ct. at 2813. This action was rather surprising because, as Justice Brennan
noted, the NLRB had fully acquiesced in the appellate court's modifications and had urged
the Court to affirm them. Id. at 2817 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For Justice O'Connor, the
primary concern was not to reach an outcome that was somehow satisfactory to the NLRB,
but to attain the proper procedural posture between the agency and the courts. Id. at 2813
n.9 (O'Connor, J.). For opinions demonstrating similar deference to agency decisions, see
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S.Ct. 2979, 2993
(1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (advocating a similarly deferential approach despite the
majority's warning that deference should not be permitted to emasculate the significance of
judicial review); cf. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462
U.S. 87, 105 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (deferring to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's judgments in an area within its scientific expertise). Her approach in Baltimore Gas is consistent
with her opposition to the judiciary's undertaking frequent technical and scientific judgments in abortion cases. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
82 104 S. Ct. 2458 (1984).
83Id. at 2472 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She similarly objected to an agency's unauthorized "arrogation of power" in NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1517 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (concerning NLRB's definition of "concerted activity" under statute). She typically follows the presumption that agency regulations and interpretations of
law are reasonable exercises of delegated power from Congress, especially when they reflect
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In addition to these fairly standard positions, Justice
O'Connor has pointed out a very different problem in the relations
between agencies and the courts. Even a deferential judiciary can
interfere with agency operations if it is .willing to hear every complaint that rests, no matter how tenuously, on agency conduct. Her
exceptional concern that the judiciary not unduly interfere with
agencies and officials is presented most clearly in two important
cases involving the issue of standing to sue. In both cases, she narrowed a private party's ability to obtain judicial review of agency
actions.
The first case, Allen v. Wright, 4 raised the issue of when a
plaintiff has standing to obtain judicial review of agency conduct.
The plaintiffs were parents of black public school children. They
brought a nationwide class action, alleging that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had not adopted adequate measures to fulfill its
obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. The plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that
the challenged IRS tax-exemption practices were unlawful and
sought injunctive relief. In her opinion for a divided Court, Justice
O'Connor held that the parents lacked standing to bring the suit.s5
Justice O'Connor prefaced her analysis with a few general remarks on the standing doctrine. In her view, the requirements for
standing "state fundamental limits on federal judicial power in our
system of government."8 6 Indeed, she stressed that the entire inquiry into standing must be conducted in -amanner consistent with
separated governmental powers and must be informed by the
"Art[icle] III notion that federal courts may exercise power only 'in
the last resort, and as a necessity.' "87 Two essential components of
the standing doctrine were at issue: first, whether the plaintiffs had
alleged a distinct and palpable injury; and second, whether any
longstanding consistency of interpretation by the agency. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tufts,
461 U.S. 300, 319-20 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (deferring to longstanding IRS regulations); United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (deferring to government personnel regulations that have been followed consistently). But see, e.g., Commissioner v. Engle, 104 S. Ct. 597, 608 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (refusing to defer to an
"unreasonable" IRS position). But in City Disposal, she did not frame the issue in this
manner and did not set out the initial presumption favoring the NLRB's interpretation.

Perhaps she did not consider that doctrine to be longstanding, or perhaps she views the
presumption more narrowly when an agency interpretation affects its own statutory grant of
power.
84 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
85 Id. at 3319.
84 Id. at 3324.
87 Id. at 3325 (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345
(1892)).
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such injury was "fairly traceable" to the challenged action so that
relief from the injury would be likely to follow upon a favorable
decision."'
In their complaint, the parents had alleged two injuries. The
first injury was the direct harm done to them by the mere fact of
government financial aid to discriminatory private schools. Justice
O'Connor denied that this claim represented any distinct and palpable injury to the parents. Instead, they were claiming either an
abstract injury based generally on the government's alleged violation of the law, or an abstract stigmatizing injury based on alleged
discrimination against others of their own race.89
The second injury alleged by the parents was their children's
diminished ability to receive an education in'a racially integrated
school. Justice O'Connor had no doubt that this was a distinct and
palpable injury, "one of the most serious injuries recognized in our
legal system." 90 Yet she denied that the injury was fairly traceable
to the challenged government conduct.
She approached this issue in two stages. First, and more conventionally, she argued that there was only an indirect line of causation between the challenged IRS conduct and the alleged segregation in the schools attended by the plaintiffs' children. The
parents had not alleged that enough racially discriminatory private
schools in their communities received tax exemptions for withdrawal of those exemptions to make an appreciable difference in
public-school integration. 1 She also argued that it was pure speculation whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular
school would lead to a change in that school's policies.9 2 The dis104 S. Ct. at 3325.
Id. at 3326-27. Justice Brennan very briefly criticized the Court's analysis of the alleged stigmatizing injury. Id. at 3335 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 3328 (majority opinion).
11Id. Justice Brennan strongly disagreed with this contention. Id. at 3337-38 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's response relied on a different interpretation of the facts
alleged in the complaint. Id. at 3328 n.23 (majority opinion).
92 Id. at 3328-29. In contrast, Justice Stevens argued that the "causation analysis is
nothing more than a restatement of elementary economics: when something becomes more
expensive, less of it will be purchased." Id. at 3344 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151
(1981), bears comparison on this issue. In Energy Action, the Court granted California
standing to challenge the Interior Department's methods for accepting bids on oil and gas
rights. Id. at 162. By law, California had a financial stake in federal oil and gas leasing. The
state complained that its return on the leases was diminished because the Interior Secretary
refused to experiment with alternative bidding systems. The injury claimed was found to be
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct. Id. at 161-62. Yet it was not intuitively obvious
that the experimentation requested would improve California's return: that outcome would
88
"
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senters strongly criticized these arguments, but the disagreements
about the application of the "fairly traceable" requirement, while
practically significant, were at least controversies within the scope
of traditional standing doctrine.
Justice O'Connor's second argument was altogether unconventional, however. She argued that the principle of separation of
powers helps to show why such an indirect link between the challenged conduct and the alleged injury was insufficient to provide
standing to bring the suit. Any other conclusion "would pave the
way generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable
Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies
establish to carry out their legal obligations."9 3 In other words,
[the principle that government should have wide latitude in
dispatching its internal affairs] counsels against recognizing
standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive
Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution, after all,
assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial
Branch, the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." . . We could not recognize respondents' standing
in this case without running afoul of that structural
9 4
principle.
This language interjects a new element into the doctrine of
standing by suggesting that separation of powers has a "role to
play in giving meaning to [standing] requirements. '' 95 Justice
depend on further actions to be taken by the Interior Secretary, namely, the adoption of one
or another system. Id. Thus, Energy Action and Allen seem to be at odds on the causation
issue. They may be distinguishable on the grounds that while Energy Action only involved
one intermediate actor, and his motivation in the matter was fairly clear, in Allen the intermediate actors included a large number of schools with a variety of conflicting interests. The
cases might also be distinguishable on the ground that the "intermediate actor" in Energy
Action was in fact one of the parties to the litigation. But Justice O'Connor did not discuss
or attempt to distinguish Energy Action in her opinion in Allen.
93 104 S. Ct. at 3329.
Id. at 3330 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3) (footnote omitted). As Justice Stevens
observed, however, the Court would only be fulfilling the traditional judicial responsibility
"'to say what the law is.'" 104 S. Ct. at 3348 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
95 104 S. Ct. at 3330 n.26. These remarks seem to be dicta, since she could have rested
the Court's holding simply on her conclusion that "[tihe links in the chain of causation
between the challenged Government conduct and the asserted injury are far too weak for
the chain as a whole to sustain respondents' standing." Id. at 3329. But she insisted on
explaining that conclusion by analyzing the "idea of separation of powers that underlies
standing doctrine." Id.
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O'Connor seems to offer a "sliding-scale approach" to standing.
She argues that if a suit before the Court raises separation-of-powers concerns, then, depending on the extent of those concerns, the
plaintiff's injury would have to be correspondingly more directly
traceable to the challenged conduct. In particular, she argues that
the Court should distinguish between two different kinds of challenged conduct. Where a plaintiff seeks to challenge government
violations of specific legal obligations, standing could be based on
an injury less directly traceable to the challenged conduct. Where a
plaintiff seeks to restructure the executive branch's approach to
fulfilling its legal duties, standing must be based on an injury that
is more directly traceable to the challenged conduct."
Justice Stevens noted in dissent that this suggestion may confuse standing (who can bring suit) with justiciability (what issues a
court can decide) by suggesting that standing doctrine should focus
not only on the party bringing the suit, but also on the issue
presented for adjudication. 97 He further criticized this separationof-powers approach because it provided no guidance to lower
courts "in determining when it is appropriate to require a more
rigorous redressability showing because of separation of powers
concerns, or how redressability can be demonstrated in a case raising separation of power [sic] concerns."98
The first criticism of Justice O'Connor's suggested approach is
powerful, but not fatal. Her approach does combine, to some extent, the issues of standing and justiciability, which had developed
as separate inquiries. But these issues are based on common constitutional and prudential concerns about the judicial function. Indeed, she tried to show that the two issues are not entirely separate even under current judicial doctrine. She argued that the
soundness of a plaintiff's claim often does affect, and should affect,
a court's judgment about whether the plaintiff has standing.9 9 In

" See id. at 3333 (complaint alleges no connection "direct enough to overcome the substantial separation-of-powers barriers to a suit seeking an injunction to reform administrative procedures").
' Id. at 3345-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3346 n.10.
Id. at 3330 (majority opinion). Justice Brennan disagreed with her evaluation of the
facts: "More than one commentator has noted that the causation component of the Court's
standing inquiry is no more than a poor disguise for the Court's view of the merits of the
underlying claims. The Court today does nothing to avoid that criticism." Id. at 3341 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Some of the Court's prior language, however, would
accommodate her test. For example, the Court has said that "the standing question is
whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as
to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's
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an era during which lower courts have intervened heavily in the
administration of government operations, such as schools, prisons,
and the like, she would restrict the occasions for extraordinary judicial action to those where the plaintiff's injury is quite directly
tied to the alleged wrong. Where a complaint raises questions
about the propriety of judicial intervention, the plaintiff's stake
must be correspondingly greater to overcome these doubts. The result is still to focus "primarily on the party" bringing the suit, and
only secondarily on the issue involved.1 0 0
Justice Stevens's second criticism is more troubling, especially
in light of Justice O'Connor's concern that the Supreme Court
should provide clear guidance to lower courts.10 1 As she pointed
out, current standing doctrine is itself "not susceptible of precise
definition.110 2 Nonetheless, her requirement-that plaintiff's alleged injury must be more directly traceable to the challenged conduct when the suit implicates separation-of-powers concernsrepresents a broad and vague balancing test, which is likely to create additional confusion in this area.
Furthermore, it is unclear exactly what kind of case will raise
separation-of-powers concerns. The distinction that Justice
O'Connor draws between suits involving government violation of a
specific legal duty and those involving the restructuring of executive-branch approaches to fulfilling legal duties may not be very
useful: very often the two categories will converge. For example,
Allen presented the claim that the IRS's approach to fulfilling a
specific legal duty-denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools-was so inadequate that it violated that
duty. As Justice Stevens noted, "the separation of powers tolerates
quite a bit of 'restructuring' in order to eliminate the effects of
racial segregation."10 3 Thus, her approach seems to require courts
remedial powers on his behalf." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (second emphasis added) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). Justice Stevens used this
passage somewhat differently in order to show that standing concentrates on the party
rather than on the issue. Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3346 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174 (1974) (emphasis in original) (citing
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)). Justice Stevens quoted this passage in order to
criticize Justice O'Connor's approach. 104 S. Ct. at 3346 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 49. The most urgent questions here would be how to
determine what kind of injury would qualify as being "more directly traceable," and how to
specify the class of circumstances in which a "more directly traceable" injury is required in
order to gain standing.
102104 S. Ct. at 3325.
103 Id.
at 3346 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). One could also view the issue in Allen as a
clash between Congress and the executive branch because the IRS allegedly failed to implement specific provisions of the Internal Revenue Code effectively. Justice O'Connor's desire

o
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to decide whether a specific legal duty has been violated at the
preliminary stage when the standing issue is determined, without
the more thorough examination that this issue often demands. To
the extent that this is true, her approach may simply provide
courts with a new weapon for reaching desired results without addressing the particular substantive concerns that would otherwise
104
be necessary to those results.
Justice O'Connor's approach can be defended, however, on the
ground that respect for the coordinate branches of government
suggests that only as a last resort should courts become involved in
restructuring executive-branch approaches to carrying out legal obligations. This concern can be illustrated by considering the theoretical problems raised in other contexts by detailed judicial oversight of various government operations. 0 5 At the same time,
however, courts must not shirk their responsibility to protect the
rights that the Constitution or Congress has conferred on individuals. Justice O'Connor's approach tries to accommodate these two
concerns in a manner more respectful of the principle of separation
of powers: when the potential interference with agency operations
is greater, courts will only hear a plaintiff who can allege a more
direct harm. Her approach may cause added confusion and will
probably lead to some premature decisions on the soundness of
plaintiffs' claims. Moreover, some wrongs alleged to have been
committed by the executive branch are likely to go unredressed.
These costs can be justified only when set against her overriding
concern to establish limits upon the intrusiveness of judicial power.

to restrict judicial involvement in this fray would then seem to be at odds with her advocacy
of fairly stringent judicial review of agency interpretations of law that would expand the
agency's own statutory grant of power. See ICC v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 104 S. Ct.
2458, 2468-72 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussed supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text); NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1517 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (rejecting the NLRB's "arrogation of power" over all collective-bargaining contracts
and contract disputes).
204 Indeed, Allen may be practically dispositive of the substantive claim. In theory, at
least, the plaintiffs could have stayed in court by alleging that judicial action would "appreciably" affect public-school integration. 104 S. Ct. at 3328. But it is not clear that any plaintiffs would ever have more facts to allege than those put forward by the plaintiffs in Allen.
If this is so, then Justice O'Connor's approach, by precluding anyone from initiating review
of the IRS regulations, could permit schools to evade integration goals more easily.
1" See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349-50, 351-52 (1981) (federal judges
should avoid intruding into state prison administration unless clear violations of the eighth
amendment are demonstrated); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (denying that
district court judges have a "free hand" to fashion school-desegregation relief embracing
more than a single school district).
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A second case, Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,'
dealt with whether the ultimate consumers of dairy products could
obtain judicial review of milk market orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to statute.10 7 Justice O'Connor concluded, for a unanimous Court, that Congress had precluded consumers from obtaining judicial review of milk market orders. In
taking this position, she articulated a narrow view of the Court's
presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.10 8 In
particular, she objected to the lower court's use of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,l0 where the Supreme Court had held that "only
upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary
legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review."1 10 Justice O'Connor argued that this standard should not be
taken in a "strict evidentiary sense" of unambiguous proof, so long
as "congressional intent to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.' """ In her view, congressional intent to preclude certain persons from obtaining judicial review of
agency action need not rest on specific language or even on specific
legislative history, but could be inferred from the statutory scheme
as a whole.' 1 2 This view allowed the presumption favoring judicial
review of administrative action to be overcome more easily.
In both of these standing cases, Justice O'Connor led the
Court in curtailing a private party's ability to involve the Court in
108 104 S. Ct. 2450 (1984).
107 The statutory authority was given in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 601 (1982)).
108 Justice O'Connor could have reached the same result simply with her argument that
the statutory scheme here was explicit enough to overturn the presumption in favor of judicial review. The facts of the case did not require that she weaken the usual force of the
presumption. See 104 S. Ct. at 2454-55.
108 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
110 Id. at 141 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)).

"1 104 S. Ct. at 2457 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 157 (1970)).
112 104 S. Ct. at 2456. Her strongest statement was that "when a statute provides a
detailed mechanism for judicial consideration of particular issues at the behest of particular
persons, judicial review of those issues at the behest of other persons may be found to be
impliedly precluded." Id. Contrary to this approach, a leading commentator has emphasized
the need for more definite expressions of legislative intent to preclude review. See Louis
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 357-59 & n.181 (1965). Moreover, in
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970), the Court had said that "judicial review is ordinarily inferred where congressional intent to protect the interests of the class of which the
plaintiff is a member can be found; in such cases, unless members of the protected class may
have judicial review the statutory objectives might not be realized." This statement and the
congressional declaration of purposes in the statute at issue in Community Nutrition,see 7
U.S.C. § 602(2), (4) (1982), which evinced concern for consumer interests, presented a strong
argument in support of standing.
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oversight of administrative agencies. 113 Her primary concern was to
limit the judicial function in a government of separated powers.
But her restrained approach may be thought inappropriate when
applied to the workings of administrative agencies, whose accountability to Congress, or even to the President, has often become al14
most fictional."
Nonetheless, administrative agencies are authorized and
funded by Congress, and most of them would seem to be a part of
the executive branch. If those branches are not adequately overseeing administrative agencies, then in her view the problem should
be corrected where it has arisen. Such shortcomings do not justify
a reactive expansion of the judicial function, which would lead to
undue interference with the policymaking branches." 5
2. Review of Legislation. Justice O'Connor's concern about
judicial interference with the legislative process, which is apparent
in her attempts to apply a "plain meaning" approach to statutory
construction, is also illustrated by her approach to judicial review
of legislation. She seeks to have the Court, wherever feasible, exercise its power to review legislation in a way that minimizes the constitutional impediments to legislative action. For example, she accepts the practice of construing statutes to avoid resolution of
constitutional questions except when absolutely necessary." 6 A
more unusual aspect of her approach to judicial review is her notion that when the Court is forced to strike down legislation and
can choose among different constitutional provisions in doing so, it
should invoke the provision that will pose the least obstacle to further legislative action in that area.
This approach was suggested in her dissent in ASARCO Inc. v.
Idaho State Tax Commission.1 7 Idaho had levied corporate in11' The substantive context of Block is ambiguous, since her narrow view of standing
doctrine led to a result that protected business interests against consumers but also denied
review of regulatory orders that restricted competition in the milk market.
114 See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENT's ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 4, 5, 1416 (1971); U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE COM-

MIrrEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

39-40

(1937).
"' In return for the wide latitude she allows to administrative agencies, she appears to
demand that they observe certain procedural safeguards in taking action or reaching decisions. See, e.g., Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344, 352 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with the Court that the Board's decision was reasonable, but arguing for remand
to the Board because it failed to provide an adequate explanation of its decision).
11 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Regan, 104 S. Ct. 1107, 1125 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (construing a statute so as to leave the Court's original jurisdiction unaffected).
117

458 U.S. 307 (1982). Her dissent also applied to a companion case, F.W. Woolworth
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come taxes on a corporation that was neither incorporated nor
domiciled in Idaho, but which operated a silver mine and did some
other business in the state. The state sought to include in the corporation's taxable income some amounts that the corporation received from subsidiary corporations having no other connection
with the state. The Court held that this state action violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because there was
no rational relation between these amounts and the intrastate
value of the corporation.1 18
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's decision to overturn the state action.1 19 But she particularly denounced the Court's
"constitutional shortsightedness" in basing its decision on the due
process clause rather than the commerce clause. s0 Under the commerce clause, Congress has the authority to regulate interstate
commerce, and Congress can exercise this power to permit the
states to restrain interstate commerce in ways that would be impermissible absent congressional authorization.
Consistent with this principle, it has long been established
that Congress generally has the power to "overrule" a decision
of this Court invalidating state legislation on Commerce
Clause grounds. . . . By contrast, Congress generally cannot
waive a ruling of this Court decided under the Due Process
Clause. Accordingly, this Court's "threshold" for invalidating
state legislation should be considerably higher under the Due
2
Process Clause than under the Commerce Clause.1 '
She argued that the Court should decline to invoke a more restrictive constitutional provision when the substantive area of law
could be better addressed outside the courts. This is particularly
true of interstate tax law. Although the Court has the "authority"
to strike down state taxes, "only Congress has both the ability to
canvass the myriad facts and factors relevant to interstate taxation
and the power to shape a nationwide system that would guarantee
the States fair revenues and offer interstate businesses freedom

Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
118 458 U.S. at 328-30. The contested statute was Idaho's version of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act. IDAHO CODE § 63-3027 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
119 458 U.S. at 349 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 350. The Court did not reach the commerce clause argument, having already
found the state action invalid under the due process clause. The Court also took no position
on the extent of federal authority to legislate in this area after its decision. Id. at 327 n.23
(majority opinion).
121 Id. at 350 n.14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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from strangulation by multiple paperwork and tax burdens."' 22
Justice O'Connor's proposal-that the Court should adopt
varying "thresholds" for invoking different constitutional provisions to strike down legislation, depending on the extent of judicial
interference with other parts of government and on the amount of
disruption likely to ensue from that interference-is consistent
with her understanding of the judicial role. Although her proposal
might lead the Court to diverge from trends established in some of
its precedents, for example, the aiplication of the due process
clause in past cases like ASARCO, 12 3 it might help to confine the
extent of judicial interference with the legislative power.
Moreover, her approach poses no far-reaching theoretical
problems, so long as it is understood to apply only to situations
where the challenged statute violates more than one constitutional
provision. In those instances, her approach would not change the
outcome of the case, in the sense that it would not affect whether
the statute is struck down or allowed to stand. It merely recognizes
that the Court's decision to invalidate a statute may erect a further
obstacle to legislative resolution of a particular problem and attempts to minimize that obstacle.
Justice O'Connor's approach raises more serious questions,
however, if her statement that "this Court's 'threshold' for invalidating state legislation should be considerably higher under the
Due Process Clause than under the Commerce Clause ' 12' 4 is meant
to apply more broadly. Suppose, for example, that a state statute
may violate the due process clause, but does not violate the commerce clause. Her proposal could be read to mean that in such a
case the due process clause should be applied with greater circumspection merely because it erects a stubborn judicial obstacle to
any further state or federal legislation. If that is so, then her approach could change the outcome by more easily allowing the statute to stand. In effect, her approach would impose a prudential
reluctance to restrict state action on constitutional provisions that
are intended to restrict state action to at least some extent. This
approach certainly would have much more dramatic implications
25
than the result in ASARCO itself seemed to suggest.
"I Id. at 331. She later elaborated upon the reasons why judicial interference in this
area should be avoided and why the Court "should not so confidently pre-empt the Congress." Id. at 350-53.
'3 See id. at 327 n.23 (majority opinion) (citing cases).
Id. at 350 n.14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
15 If her approach is not meant to narrow due process restrictions, however, it may
lead to more, not less, judicial interference with legislative solutions. For example, where a
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Another example of this approach is Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Zobel v. Williams,126 where the Court struck
down an Alaska statute that established a program to distribute
the state's mineral income to its citizens in amounts that varied
according to the length of time that each citizen had resided in
Alaska since it entered the Union. The Court held, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Burger, that the program violated the equal protection clause because the distinction it made between newer and
older residents 7was not even minimally related to any legitimate
12
state purpose.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, but offered a different rationale. To begin with, she was much more sympathetic to
the state interests, and she rejected the Court's sweeping determination that Alaska's objective here was wholly illegitimate:
A desire to compensate citizens for their prior contributions is
neither inherently invidious nor irrational. Under some circumstances, the objective may be wholly reasonable. Even a
generalized desire to reward citizens for past endurance, particularly in a State where years of hardship only recently have
produced prosperity, is not innately improper. 2 8
In her view, the Court had gone too far because its opinion ensured
that "any governmental program depending upon a 'past contributions' rationale will violate the Equal Protection Clause." 2 9
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor concluded that Alaska's pro-

particular statutory scheme violates both the commerce clause and the due process clause,
invoking the commerce clause alone might only lead to the enactment, by Congress or with
its consent, of a similarly invalid scheme, which the courts would then have to strike down
again on due process grounds. Thu§, it might be better to invalidate it under the more
restrictive provision in the first place, so that legislative bodies may be more certain' of the
precise obstacles to further enactments.
Actually, the broader interpretation of her language-as an attempt to narrow due process restrictions against the states-is compatible with her views on federalism and on substantive constitutional issues, which are discussed infra notes 138-292 and accompanying
text.
128 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
"22 Id.
at 60-64. The statutory scheme was enacted under an authorizing provision in
the state constitution. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15 (1980); ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.23.010 -.100
(1980) (repealed 1982).
128 457 U.S. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). A footnote to this passage, id. n.1, offered several examples of state goals that she thought might be legitimately

served by rewarding citizens for their past contributions. Thus, she thought that her invocation of the privileges and immunities clause imposed a narrower restraint on state action
than did the Court's equal protection analysis.
129Id. at 73 n.2.
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gram was invalid under the privileges and immunities clause.13 0
She argued that the state program directly threatened the recognized constitutional "right to travel.' 131 Moreover, she attempted
to link this right to the privileges and immunities clause by a historical analysis, showing that the clause was originally tied to a
guarantee of "'free ingress and regress to and from any other
State.'-132 Although Alaska's objective in this particular instance
was not an inherently illegitimate use of its sovereign powers, it
necessarily would impose a burden on citizens of other states in
exercising their fundamental right to establish a new residence in
Alaska. 13 3 In her view, a state can make distinctions among its own
citizens in order to reward specific past contributions, but it cannot use its powers more generally to discriminate against citizens
of other states. 34
Both the Court's opinion and Justice Rehnquist's dissent disagreed with her application of the privileges and immunities
clause. They referred to prior decisions holding that this clause
merely assures that nonresidents of a state will be on equal footing
with residents, without controlling a state government's powers
over its own citizens.'3 5 In reply, she argued that Alaska's program
burdened citizens of other states who were deciding whether to reside in Alaska and that it was irrelevant that the discrimination
did not gain force until after the nonresident moved into the state.
3o "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.1.
"'
457 U.S. at 74, 78-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 79 (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV). She argued that this phrase
was only omitted from the Constitution's version of the clause because it was redundant.
457 U.S. at 79-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133 457 U.S. at 72-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168, 180 (1869)).
"' She arrived at the latter conclusion by applying the privileges and immunities test
that had been developed by the Court in cases such as Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518
(1978). First, the right asserted by a nonresident must be "fundamental" in order to gain
protection: here she identified the right to establish residence in a new state. Second, the
state still may burden such a right if it can show that nonresidents are a peculiar source of
an evil at which the statute is directed and that its discrimination bears a substantial relationship to that evil. She concluded that Alaska could not make either showing. 457 U.S. at
76-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135 457 U.S. at 59 n.5 (majority opinion); id. at 84 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the
clause "'was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same
privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy' ") (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
395 (1948)). Justice Brennan approved of her emphasis on the "right to travel," but agreed
with prior decisions holding that the right need not be tied particularly to the privileges and
immunities clause or any other constitutional provision. 457 U.S. at 66-67 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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"Each group of citizens who migrated to Alaska in the past, or
chooses to move there in the future, lives in the State on less
13 6
favorable terms than those who arrived earlier.'
Justice O'Connor's creative application of the privileges and
immunities clause in Zobel is not altogether implausible. Her aim
was to allow each state greater power to make just distinctions
among its citizens, without permitting the state to discriminate
against citizens of other states. 137 Her approach demonstrates once
again her determination to avoid striking down legislation on
broad grounds of due process or equal protection when some other
provision can be found that erects less formidable obstacles to the
exercise of state powers.
Justice O'Connor's opinions in these cases illustrate her willingness to take nontraditional positions in order to restrain judicial
activity. In Allen and Block, she sought to raise the threshold for
judicial involvement in disputes over agency actions. In ASARCO
and Zobel, she argued that the Court should exercise its power to
review legislation in a manner that would create the least possible
limitation on the scope of legislative action. Both of these positions
can be considered "activist" because they call for the Court to
adopt new approaches in cases that could have been disposed of in
more conventional ways. But these positions also require the Court
to be more circumspect in its relations with the political branches
of government. What is unusual about her stance is the vigor with
which she seeks to curb what she supposes to be actual and
threatened excesses of judicial power.
Thus, in Justice O'Connor's view, "judicial restraint" translates into a very cautious assertion of judicial power. Yet it is not
always the same thing as doctrinal caution; it may demand aggres:3S457 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137 Thus, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Zobel also reflects her views about federalism,
which focus on the logical implications of statehood as an independent base of state power.
In Zobel, however, state power is shown to be bounded by the necessary implications of a
federal union, especially "the constitutional purpose of maintaining a Union rather than a
mere 'league of States.'" Id. at 72-73 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180
(1869)).
Justice O'Connor's dissent in ASARCO is also relevant on this point. Although in
ASARCO she sought to avoid obstacles to congressionalpower, her concern was also for the
states, since her opinion suggested that she would expect Congress and the states to act
jointly in addressing the issues of tax apportionment raised in that case. ASARCO, 458 U.S.
at 349 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Furthermore, she complained in ASARCO about the
emerging judicial doctrines concerning the apportionment of business taxes among the
states, which she thought were too restrictive of state taxing powers. Id. at 344-45. Justice
O'Connor's approach to federalism issues is discussed infra notes 138-205 and accompanying text.
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siveness, but aggressiveness in service of the main objective, which
is to restrain the scope of judicial action. As can be seen from these
cases, there are troublesome areas in which she has had difficulty
translating her particular form of judicial restraint into a consistent approach. But the occasional difficulties in drawing out the
precise ramifications of her proposals should not obscure the innovative direction of her judicial approach.
II.

FEDERALISM AND THE COURT

Before coming to the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor served
in several prominent state government posts. Not unexpectedly,
she has emerged as a staunch proponent of at least a "bare bones"
federalism. Consistently with her views on judicial restraint, she
does not seek the great explosion in federal court activity that
would probably be necessary to turn the clock back on the vast
historical expansion of federal power. But she does try to put some
restraints on federal action in order to protect the independent
mechanisms of state government. In her view, the states are separately functioning political units that must be permitted to operate, within their necessarily limited sphere, with as much autonomy as possible.
A. Federal Legislation as a Limitation on State Power
1. Tenth Amendment Limitations on FederalPower. Justice
O'Connor has set forth her view of federalism most fully in cases in
which a state has invoked the tenth amendment to seek invalidation of direct impositions created by federal legislation. Her use of
the tenth amendment to limit Congress's broad power to regulate
interstate commerce stems from the Court's decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery138 in 1976. As the law stood before the
Court's recent decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,1 3 9 the Court would invalidate federal enactments that met three tests: they must regulate the states as states,
they must address matters that are indisputably attributes of state
sovereignty, and they must directly impair state efforts to structure integral operations in areas of traditional state governmental
functions. 1"4 0 National League of Cities, however, was the only in426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S.
Ct. 1005 (1985).
139 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
10 See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
138
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stance in which the Court invalidated a federal law on those
grounds.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v.

Mississippi

14 1

(FERC) gave the Court a further opportunity to consider the
scope of its tenth amendment doctrine. Mississippi and one of its
public commissions invoked the amendment to challenge provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978142 that

required state utility commissions to consider adopting and implementing federal rate, design, and regulatory standards and that required state commissions to follow certain notice and comment
procedures when considering the proposed federal standards.
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court first found that
Congress had the power to preempt the field of private-utility regulation. 143 It then held that these particular requirements did not
violate the tenth amendment because they involved no "compelled
exercise of Mississippi's sovereign powers. And, equally important,
they do not set a mandatory agenda to be considered in all events
by state legislative or administrative decisionmakers. As we read
for continued
them, [the provisions] simply establish requirements
1 44
state activity in an otherwise preemptible field."'

Justice O'Connor's strong dissent presented her views on federalism in a most direct manner, opposing what she saw as the
Court's "fundamental misunderstanding of the role that state governments play in our federalist system.' 1 45 She argued that the

federal provisions violated the National League of Cities doctrine
as well as constitutional history by "conscript[ing] state utility
commissions into the national bureaucratic army. '' 14' As she
explained:
State legislative and administrative bodies are not field
offices of the national bureaucracy. Nor are they think tanks
to which Congress may assign problems for extended study.
Instead, each State is sovereign within its own domain, governing its citizens and providing for their general welfare.
While the Constitution and federal statutes define the boundaries of that domain, they do not harness state power for na287-88 (1981).
141 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
142 The challenged provisions of the Act were 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211 (1982); 16 U.S.C.

§§ 824a-3, 2611-2613 (1982).
143 456

U.S. at 765-66.
Id. at 769.
145 Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 775.
14
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tional purposes. The Constitution contemplates "an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States," a system
in which both the State and National Governments retain a
"separate and independent existence.' 147

She rejected tbe Court's reasoning on two grounds. First, it
contradicted the tenth amendment standard set out in National
League of Cities. The challenged provisions regulated the states as
states, as their commands were directed at state regulatory agencies. They also affected attributes of state sovereignty, since they
directly affected the states' power to set their own policy agendas.
Finally, the provisions directly impaired a state's ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional state governmental
functions by imposing restrictions on how state agencies regulating
utilities could choose to discharge their responsibilities. 8
Second, she denied the Court's finding that the "greater" federal power to preempt the field included the "lesser" power to impose these requirements upon states. In her view, the challenged
provisions intruded further upon state powers than outright preemption would have. Preemption would establish a definite realm
of proscribed state action and would leave states free to devote
their resources and energies elsewhere. Moreover, it would not confuse the public in determining who was politically accountable for
specific measures. 1 49 She went on to review constitutional history
in order to show the novelty of national action conducted through
the exercise of "military or legislative power" mandating specific
actions by state governments. 5
117 Id. at 777 (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869), overruled,
Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71,
76 (1869)).
14S456 U.S. at 778-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court did not systematically apply the three criteria for judging whether a tenth amendment violation had occurred, but
relied primarily on assimilating FERC to Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See 456 U.S. at 764-71 (majority opinion). In Hodel, the
federal law invited each state to submit a regulatory program for federal approval. The
federal authority could either accept the state program or implement its own program. Accordingly, Justice O'Connor sought to distinguish Hodel, which she described as a true example of cooperative federalism, by emphasizing that the Hodel approach imposed smaller
burdens on the states while maintaining clear lines of political accountability. Id. at 782-84
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" 456 U.S. at 786-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 791-96. The majority disputed her historical analysis. Id. at 761-62 & n.25
(majority opinion). Although Justice O'Connor's analysis in FERC rested on a procedural
defense of state powers, she noted that in future cases the Court could offer a more substantive defense of state powers because it "has not explored fully the extent of 'traditional'
state functions." Id. at 781 n.7 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Justice Blackmun described Justice O'Connor's argument
about preemption as "peculiar." He concluded that Congress "intended to defer to state prerogatives-and expertise-in declining
to pre-empt the utilities field entirely. .... Certainly, it is a curious type of federalism that encourages Congress to pre-empt a
field entirely, when its preference is to let the States retain the
primary regulatory role."' 151 In essence, he saw this set of measures
as a permissible exercise in cooperative federalism. Justice
O'Connor emphatically disagreed: "This Court's task is to enforce
constitutional limits on congressional power, not to decide whether
alternative courses would better serve state and federal interests.' 1

52

Merely calling a program "cooperative federalism" cannot

save it from violating the tenth amendment if it infringes on the
15
most fundamental reserved powers of the states. 1
Thus, Justice O'Connor rejected the Court's apparent confidence that federalism could rely on the cooperative attitude of
Congress-a view that the Court would later carry to its extreme
conclusion in Garcia. 54 But her view rests, at least in this instance,
on a different sort of confidence in Congress. She would prohibit
Congress from embarking on this kind of exercise in cooperative
federalism, leaving it with a stark choice between preemption and
some less intrusive approach. It seems quite possible, however,
that in most instances where Congress might have desired a FERC
approach, it would have continued to eschew preemption and
55
sought some cooperative alternative.
151 Id. at 765 n.29 (majority opinion).

15' Id. at 786 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In rejecting the argument that the greater federal power of preemption included the lesser power to demand specific action by state gov-

ernments, she quoted former Attorney General Edward H. Levi's warning "against 'lov[ing]
the States to their demise.'" Id. at 786 n.17 (quoting National StandardsNo-Fault Motor
Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 503, 507 (1975)).
153 She also rejected the possibility that the federal interest here could justify state
submission to the federal action, a possible extra prong in the tenth amendment test that
has never been invoked. "Whatever the ultimate content of that standard, it must refer not
only to the weight of the asserted federal interest, but also to the necessity of vindicating
that interest in a manner that intrudes upon state sovereignty." 456 U.S. at 781 n.8
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); cf. supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text (discussing her
separation-of-powers approach to the issue of standing to gain judicial review of agency
orders).
1'4 See infra text accompanying note 159.
155 Justice O'Connor's summary rejection of a tenth amendment challenge in Bell v.
New Jersey, 103 S. Ct. 2187 (1983), is also of some interest. New Jersey challenged a federal
statute that allowed the federal government to recover federal education funds misused by
the state. The state had assumed this obligation as a condition on its receipt of federal
funding. Treating the transaction like a voluntary contract, Justice O'Connor concluded
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At the root of this disagreement, to be sure, was a difference in
views over the validity of the National League of Cities doctrine.
This difference in views has emerged even more clearly now that
the Court has overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.1 56 Garcia presented
the same issue that was presented in National League of Cities:
whether state and local government officials could be covered by
federal wage and hour laws. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the
Court held that the federal laws did apply against state sovereign
units, expressly overruling National League of Cities.157 The majority opinion in Garcia stressed the difficulty that courts had experienced in defining "traditional governmental functions" that
would be immune from federal regulation, a difficulty that the
Court thought to be so great as to make the doctrine unworkable. 1 8 The Court also suggested that tenth amendment protection
for states was redundant. The constitutional structure of the federal government-namely, representation by state in the Senate,
state participation in the electoral college, and state power over the
electoral requirements for its federal representatives-established
"procedural safeguards" that have proven effective in preserving
state interests. 59
In line with the position she had elaborated at greater length
in FERC, Justice O'Connor vehemently dissented. While accepting
that Congress had been given broad and flexible powers to regulate
commerce, she nonetheless stated that the "true 'essence' of federalism is that the States as States have legitimate interests which
the National Government is bound to respect even though its laws
are supreme."' 60 In her view, this core of federalism means at least
two things. First, the great scope of congressional powers most certainly does not include power to trample state sovereignty: "It is
not enough that the 'end be legitimate'; the means to that end cho-

that the measure did not interfere with state sovereignty. But she noted that the state had
not challenged "the program itself as intruding unduly on its sovereignty." Id. at 2197. Thus
she identified, but left aside for the moment, the issue of whether some federally funded
programs may be drafted coercively enough to infringe state sovereignty-in short, that the
tenth amendment might limit the congressional spending power.
1- 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).

Id. at 1007, 1020.
16$Id. at 1010-16. Ironically, this same prong of the National League of Cities test that
Justice O'Connor pointed to in FERC as providing an avenue for possible expansion of
tenth amendment limitations on congressional powers, see supra note 150, served as the
primary basis for the Court's rejection of that doctrine.
'59 105 S. Ct. at 1017-20.
11o Id. at 1034 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
167
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sen by Congress must not contravene the spirit of the Constitution."16 Second, the complexities of maintaining a federal structure within a nation where technology and societal change have
vastly eroded the significance of state boundaries must be reflected
in the Court's approach. National League of Cities had held out
the promise of developing a blueprint for state relations with the
federal government. Although that promise remains unfulfilled, the
difficulties of defining the boundaries of tenth amendment doctrine
do not justify the Court in evading the task.162 But even if National League of Cities were to be rejected, then a more appropriate resolution may lie "in weighing state autonomy as a factor in
the balance when interpreting the means by which Congress can
exercise its authority on the States as States. 1' 6 3 Thus, Justice
O'Connor argued for adherence to National League of Cities despite its apparent practical difficulties; and in the alternative, she
flatly rejected the Court's reliance on the structure of the federal
political process as the basic safeguard of state interests.
2. Federal Preemption of State Legislation. In addition to
the protection she would offer the states under the tenth amendment, Justice O'Connor appears determined to construe the reach
of federal statutes narrowly when necessary to minimize the preemption of state legislative power. Her dissent in Southland Corp.
64
v. Keating1
demonstrates this determination. At issue was a possible clash between the Federal Arbitration Act16 5 and a California
law. 66 The California Supreme Court had held that claims arising
under the state law were not arbitrable, but must be brought in
state court. In contrast, the federal law broadly endorsed arbitration as a method of resolving civil claims. The Court concluded
67
that the state law, so construed, violated the supremacy clause.
The federal statute was held to be a substantive law, promulgated
under Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. "In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the conId. at 1036 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
182 105 S. Ct. at 1037-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). No doubt one of the major sources

of this problem has been the Court's steadfast refusal to apply its tenth amendment doctrine with any bite in cases after National League of Cities.
181 Id. at 1037.
1
104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
185 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
188 Franchise Investment Law, CAL. CORP. CODE § 31,512 (West 1977).
187 104 S. Ct. at 861.

1985]

The Jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor

tracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. '168
Justice O'Connor offered a very different interpretation of
congressional intent. She characterized the federal law as procedural in nature and as intended to apply only in federal courts.
Thus, it did not preempt a state law applicable only in state
courts. 16 9

Although Southland could perhaps be viewed as no more than
a disagreement about congressional intent, Justice O'Connor's desire to narrow the scope of federal preemption is clear enough. In
Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees InternationalUnion Local 54,170 she spoke for the Court in finding no conflict between a
New Jersey law regulating the qualifications of casino industry
17 1
union officials and portions of the National Labor Relations Act.
As Justice White pointed out in dissent, however, the state law did
more than limit who could serve as union officials; it imposed sanctions on offending unions themselves, including prohibitions on receiving dues. In his view, this prohibition was in direct conflict, as
172
a matter of law, with federally protected rights of employees.
Justice O'Connor, for the Court, remanded for a factual determination of whether the prohibition on collecting dues incapacitated
the local from carrying out the responsibilities of a collective bargaining agent, but she was unwilling to find preemption as a matter of law.173 Indeed, in Fidelity FederalSavings & Loan Associa74
tion v. de la Cuesta,1
where she agreed with the Court's holding
of preemption, she wrote a separate concurrence simply to emphasize that the preemption power exercised in that case was not "limitless" and to point out several kinds of local laws that could not
7
be supplanted. 5
148 Id. at 858.
189 Id. at 865-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She also argued that if the federal statute
did create any substantive rights, the state courts should still be permitted to develop their
own procedures for enforcing those rights. Id. at 868-69 & n.20. The Court apparently
agreed. Id. at 861 n.10 (majority opinion).

170 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984).

1
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). The state law was the
Casino Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to -152 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
171 104 S. Ct. at 3192-93 (White, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 3191-92; see also Rice v. Rehner, 103 S. Ct. 3291 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (holding that federal law authorized, rather than preempted, state regulation of Indian liquor
transactions).
174 458 U.S. 141 (1982). The preemption issue here was slightly different from that in
Brown because it concerned the extent to which a federal agency had the statutory power to
issue regulations that preempted conflicting state judicial doctrine. The differences, however, were unimportant.
.175Id. at 171-72 (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf. Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273,
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The Federal and State Judiciaries

Justice O'Connor's view of federalism also informs her outlook
on how the federal courts should interact with their state counterparts. She does not view state courts as errant children in need of
parental guidance by the federal courts. Rather, both the federal
and state judiciaries play equally important roles as partners in the
federal scheme and each deserves the other's respect.
1. Exhaustion of State Remedies. Justice O'Connor's willingness to grant considerable independence and responsibility to state
courts is most evident in her desire to prevent the federal courts
from reviewing cases where state remedies have not been completely exhausted. This approach bolsters the role of state courts
in two ways. First, it emphasizes that state courts are on a par with
federal courts in their ability to treat all the issues that arise in a
given case. Second, it ensures that the separate judicial machinery
of the various states, once engaged, must be used to the fullest
before any federal court intervention is permissible.
Justice O'Connor's support for requiring exhaustion of state
remedies has shown up primarily in cases involving federal habeas
corpus petitions. 17 In Rose v. Lundy, 177 the defendant had been
convicted of rape and other offenses. After unsuccessfully seeking
relief from the conviction in state court, he filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Under federal statute, 17 a state prisoner's application for the federal writ based on
an alleged federal constitutional violation will not be granted unless the applicant has exhausted the remedies that are available in
state courts. In this case, the defendant's petition included two
claims that had been exhausted in state court and two claims that
had not. The language of the statute did not indicate how strictly
the exhaustion requirement should apply to such a "mixed" petition. Without assessing the merits of the unexhausted claims, the
79
district court granted the writ.

293-99 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (limitations period in federal quiet-title statute
does not bar a sovereign state); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (federal immigration statute only prohibits state
from charging out-of-state tuition to nonimmigrant alien who is exempted by federal law
from both federal and state taxes, not to one who is exempt from federal taxes only).
M78
But it arises in other areas as well. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (urging Congress to reconsider statutory provisions that do
not require exhaustion of state remedies in federal civil rights actions).
1-7 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
178 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1982).
1 455 U.S. at 511-13.
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The Supreme Court reversed. Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that a "total
exhaustion" rule was applicable here, requiring district courts to
dismiss habeas corpus petitions that contain both exhausted and
unexhausted claims. If rigorously enforced, this rule "will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts,
thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of
constitutional error."180 This result serves the dual purposes of the
statute: "to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of fed8
eral law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings."' '
The most telling part of Justice O'Connor's opinion, however,
and the only part that failed to carry a majority, was her suggestion in dicta that a prisoner should be required to present all
claims together, in the same petition for the federal writ, and to do
so only when they have all been exhaustecL If he does not, the federal courts should be permitted to decline to hear additional claims
that become exhausted later. "Thus a prisoner who decides to proceed only with his exhausted claims and deliberately sets aside his
unexhausted claims risks dismissal of subsequent federal petitions." 82 Under this approach, in order to maximize his chances of
obtaining the federal writ, a prisoner must first exhaust state remedies for all the claims he might ever wish to present. In other
words, Justice O'Connor seems to regard the shift from seeking
state remedies to seeking federal relief as more akin to crossing the
Rubicon than it is to crossing the street to another courtroom. As a
practical matter, her view apparently would lead to a much greater
insulation of state court proceedings from the potential intrusions
of the federal writ.
The most direct criticism of this approach was contained in
Justice Stevens' dissent. He argued that the writ of habeas corpus
is "a fundamental guarantee of liberty," and therefore its availability "should depend primarily on the character of the alleged
constitutional violation and not on the procedural history underlying the claim.' 18 3 This view is antithetical to Justice O'Connor's
approach, for it suggests that federal habeas relief provides a remedy that is superior to any relief that can be obtained from a state
court.184 Thus, in certain serious instances, federal relief would be
180 Id. at 518-19.
181Id. at 518.
181Id. at 521.

Id. at 546, 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181 Justice O'Connor's position confronted the unspoken but pervasive assumption that
183
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a justifiable intrusion into state proceedings without regard to the
exhaustion doctrine and its niceties. In Justice O'Connor's view, no
such presumption is justified: both state and federal courts offer
habeas remedies, both remedies are available on the same grounds
and must be presumed equally effective in achieving the same goal,
and both can be explored in turn. Yet they should be explored in
turn in a manner that minimizes federal interference with state judicial systems.
This disagreement between the two Justices was also at the
heart of Engle v. Isaac,185 decided only one month after Rose. Although the case did not directly address the exhaustion doctrine, it
raised similar issues. 86 At issue in Engle was whether the petitioner in a federal habeas proceeding could raise a constitutional
claim after he had forfeited that claim in the state courts by failing
to comply with a state procedural rule. Justice O'Connor's opinion,
for a bare majority, disallowed the claim. Although the Court was7
s
merely reaffirming its earlier holding in Wainwright v. Sykes,
she took the occasion to stress that the federal writ
imposes special costs on our federal system. The States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law. In criminal trials they also hold the initial responsibility
for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into
state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power
to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor
88
constitutional rights.1
In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens again criticized the

the federal courts stand as special shields of individual liberties, in contrast to the state
courts, which are thought less solicitous of criminal defendants (perhaps because of a more
immediate concern for public safety). She flatly rejects this view of state courts, see infra
note 188 and accompanying text, but her pronounced sympathy with government interests
would also be compatible with accepting this view and defending the state courts precisely
because they are more inclined toward protecting the public. See infra notes 208-56 and
accompanying text.
:85 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
186 Justice Brennan argued that Isaac's petition for the writ did raise the same exhaustion issue decided in Rose. Id. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor construed the petition to present no unexhausted claim. See id. at 123 n.25 (majority opinion).
.87 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977) (holding that defendant's failure to follow state procedural
requirements constituted an "independent and adequate state procedural ground" precluding the Court's review).
1" 456 U.S. at 128 (majority opinion); see also McKaskle v. Vela, 104 S. Ct. 736, 738
(1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that the exhaustion rule
prevents federal courts from reviewing federal habeas petitions containing allegations of error that were not raised in state court but are integral to the constitutional challenge).
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Court for its "preoccupation with procedural hurdles." 18 9 His criticism here was muted, however, because the Court's opinion had
conceded that the federalism principles it relied upon could be
overridden by "the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.' 190 This concession by Justice O'Connor invites
comparison with her opinion in Rose. In Rose, she indicated an
unwillingness to subordinate the exhaustion doctrine, and the important federalism principles that it effectuates, to the federal judiciary's self-defined role as the guarantor of liberty. Yet here she
suggested that there may be occasions where state procedural rules
must be subordinated to federal judicial power. This concession illustrates the rough and perhaps unsettled boundaries to Justice
O'Connor's view of federalism. Although she seeks adherence to
stricter procedural principles in the relations between state and
federal courts, she accepts the subordination of state powers to important federal concerns.
2. Adequate and Independent State Grounds. Another matter bearing on relations between the federal and state judiciaries
comprises those instances in which the Supreme Court is asked to
decline review of state court decisions that are claimed to rest on
an "adequate and independent state ground." When that claim is
correct, the Court declines to review the state court's decision because its decision could not alter that of the state court and thus
would be advisory. 191 In three cases, Justice O'Connor has given
especially careful attention to such claims. 19 2 Although she finally
agreed that jurisdiction was proper in all three cases, one of them
is of particular interest.
In Michigan v. Long, 93 Justice O'Connor set out a new approach to determining whether a decision rests on an "adequate
and independent state ground." The Michigan Supreme Court had
ordered evidence in a criminal trial suppressed because it was the
product of an illegal search. In its decision, the Michigan court
194
mentioned provisions of both the federal and state constitutions.

18

456 U.S. at 136 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

o Id. at 135.
'. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945), overruled on other grounds, Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
191 The two cases not examined here are Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255 (1982) (taking
jurisdiction despite failure to comply with a state procedural rule), and United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (taking jurisdiction against an argument that a local District of
Columbia law resolved the matter).
193 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
19"Id. at 3474 n.3 (citing the state court opinion).
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The defendant argued that because the state constitution afforded
greater protection from search than the fourth amendment, it provided an adequate and independent state ground for the decision,
and therefore the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to review the
case.
Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority of the Court, rejected
this argument and took jurisdiction. She concluded from the contents of the state court's analysis that it had rested its decision
primarily on federal law, despite its brief references to the state
constitution, and that reliance on federal law should be presumed
"in the absence of a plain statement that the decision below rested
on an adequate and independent state ground."'19 5
In reaching this result, she offered a new treatment of the jurisdictional issue to replace what she felt were the Court's prior
inconsistent and unsatisfactory approaches. In particular, she opposed the practices of having the Supreme Court either examine
state law itself or require clarification from the state courts. The
former alternative required the Court to decide unfamiliar issues
of state law going beyond the opinion under review; the latter
would impose significant burdens on state courts to settle questions of federal jurisdiction, which were irrelevant to the statecourt determination and only arose after the case left the state
court system. 19 This left two possible options: a rebuttable presumption of federal jurisdiction or of its absence. Her solution was
to presume federal jurisdiction in unclear cases in order to protect
uniformity in federal law, but to allow the state courts to overcome
this presumption by including a statement to the contrary. This
provides an easy and clear guideline for both federal and state
courts to follow. "If the state court decision indicates clearly and
expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent 97grounds, we, of course, will not undertake
to review the decision.'

This new standard attracted immediate criticism on the
ground that it expanded federal judicial power over the state
courts. In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens argued for a presumption against jurisdiction in unclear cases, contending that the
Court's approach failed both to respect state courts and to exercise
judicial restraint, which "allows other decisional bodies to have the
last word in legal interpretation until it is truly necessary for this
195

Id. at 3478.

196Id. at 3475-76.
197

Id. at 3476.
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Court to intervene."198
This criticism sheds interesting light on Justice O'Connor's
approach to federalism. She did not shrink from expanding the occasions for federal court review of state court judgments. 99 Her
opinion in Long evinced no desire to permit the last word in legal
interpretation to lie with the state courts where it might interfere
with the uniformity of federal law.200 Instead, her chief concern in
Long was to keep the manner of determining any "adequate and
independent state ground" from becoming too intrusive upon state
judicial functions. As she explained it, her approach "will provide
state judges with a clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference, and yet will preserve the
integrity of federal law."2 0 In short, the mechanisms of state government are to be protected against federal intrusions, but not be20 2
yond the proper sphere of state governmental functions.
198 Id. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also briefly indicated his disagreement with this ruling. Id. at 3483 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens further criticized the Court for ignoring the principle of stare decisis,
since it had substituted a new presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction in place of the
opposite rule. Id. at 3489-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But the question of whether to return
to an older, rejected line of precedent involves concerns similar to those identified by Justice
O'Connor in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
452-61 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussed supra notes 31-49 and accompanying
text), where she had urged the rejection of precedent. Presumably the older line of precedent had already been abandoned because the Court found it unsatisfactory.
199 It may be noted in passing, however, that the application of the bare language of her
approach, without more, might not lead to any expansion of federal power to review state
decisions, depending on how deferential the Court would be in reviewing the state court's
statement that its decision rested on adequate and independent grounds. If a bare statement would be considered sufficient, then state courts could easily insulate their decisions
from federal scrutiny. Cf. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2329-30 (1984)
(O'Connor, J.) (giving extensive deference to legislative statements).
100 Cf. supra note 49 (discussing Justice O'Connor's conviction that the Court should
exercise strong guiding power within the judicial system). This point is reinforced by considering an interesting federalism issue raised by Justice Stevens in Long. He argued that the
Court should not bother to review cases like this one, where the complaining party "is an
officer of the state itself, who asks us to rule that the state court interpreted federal rights
too broadly and 'overprotected' the citizen." 103 S. Ct. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If
the state of Michigan were a separate sovereign nation, its interpretation would be of no
concern to the United States, as no individual's rights were infringed. Id. at 3490-92. Justice
O'Connor showed no interest in avoiding review of a state court's generous interpretation of
federal constitutional law, although she has agreed with the view that states may provide
greater protections in their own criminal laws than the Constitution requires. See California
v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3459-60 (1983) (O'Connor, J.).
201 103 S. Ct. at 3476 (majority opinion).
202 This position is reflected in a speech that Justice O'Connor delivered at the College
of William and Mary while she was still on the Arizona bench. Deploring the current state
of affairs, in which "state appellate court judges occasionally become so frustrated with the
extent of federal court intervention that they simply abdicate in favor of the federal juris-
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Although Long thus seems compatible with Justice O'Connor's
views on federalism, it also bears comparison with the habeas cases
in light of its substantive context. The bulk of these "adequate and
independent state ground" cases come to the Court, as did Long,
in a procedural setting in which one party is seeking to narrow the
lower court's construction of constitutional provisions.2 03 In other
words, the Court usually is being asked to overturn a judgment
below that was particularly protective of individual rights. Justice
O'Connor's willingness to erect a presumption in favor of federal
jurisdiction in these cases may simply indicate her willingness to
have the Court examine and possibly overturn these typically "liberal" results.2 04 In contrast, the habeas cases involve a party who is
asking the federal courts for more generous treatment than was
afforded in prior proceedings. Her position in these cases, which
strongly defends the exhaustion doctrine, makes it more difficult
for the federal courts to intervene and grant a more "liberal" reading of constitutional provisions. Thus, her approach here is in harmony with Long in the sense that both serve to discourage the
courts from reaching results that are particularly solicitous of individual rights.20 5

diction," she stated that "we should strive to make both the federal and the state [judicial]
systems strong, independent, and viable." O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between
the Federal and State Courtsfrom the Perspectiveof a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 801, 801, 814 (1981).
203 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117
(1945), overruled, Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
204 Moreover, Long's "grant" of jurisdiction to the Court in these ambiguous cases can
have substantive federalism results because it enables the Court to review state-court criminal judgments that may rely on an overly broad understanding of federal constitutional
protections. Long itself is typical of this kind of case. The state court may have reversed the
defendant's conviction because it mistakenly thought that the federal Constitution compelled the result. Long authorizes the Supreme Court to reach that constitutional question,
to articulate the (possibly more limited) scope of the constitutional protection, and to allow
the state court a second chance to rule on the state constitutional issue free of possible
misconceptions about controlling federal law. To the extent that this approach gives "mistaken" state courts more freedom in determining the scope of state protections, it results in
less federalization of state criminal law. This substantive consequence of Long is consistent
with Justice O'Connor's concern for federalism.
200 In a recent speech, Justice O'Connor herself coupled the habeas relief cases with
"adequate and independent state grounds" cases. See O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism,
35 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1 (1984-1985). For further discussion of Justice O'Connor's approach to more substantive constitutional provisions, see infra notes 208-56 and accompanying text.
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III.

The Jurisprudenceof Justice O'Connor
THE CALCULUS OF INTERESTS: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE
AUTHORITY TO GOVERN

As emphasized earlier, 0 Justice O'Connor seeks to restrain
judicial intervention into the operations of other branches of government. In the more "substantive" areas of constitutional law,
that approach often leads her to defer to government interests in
the course of weighing those interests against the rights claimed by
individuals.0 7 Of course, the causal connection may also run in the
opposite direction: the belief that individual rights and protections
have been interpreted too broadly, and that the needs of government deserve more respect than they currently evoke, would point
to more sparing use of the judicial power. The.precise nature of the
causal relation in Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence is less important than the harmony between the two positions.
Nonetheless, this second interpretation is useful in understanding the direction of Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence on issues of constitutional protections. These issues are typically approached through the language of "rights," and the framework for
debate about constitutional protections rests on a belief in the priority of individual liberties. According to this view, good government is limited government, instituted by the consent of the governed, and entered into only to secure the continued preservation
of life and liberty; it is therefore necessary for the governed always
to be vigilant against uses of government power that encroach on
private spheres of liberty. Constitutional protection of individual
rights institutionalizes this suspicion of government power. Yet, it
is possible to view these issues from a perspective that is more respectful of the government's authority. Government is instituted in
order to preserve life and liberty; without vigorous government, individuals would be vulnerable to criminal behavior that renders
them less secure in their persons and property, and to political behavior that threatens their fundamental freedoms. Good government, although limited in its powers, seeks to advance the most
essential collective interests of citizens in a healthy political community. Government power is not simply destructive of liberty; indeed, government is an indispensable guardian of life and liberty.
On this view, a reasonable approach to constitutional protections
must balance the collective interest in strong government against
104See supra notes 3-137 and accompanying text.
207 For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's role in forging a "majoritarian" Court, see
Stone, O.T. 1983 and the Era of Aggressive MAajoritarianism:A Court in Transition,19 GA.
L. REv. 15, 23 (1984).
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rightful fear of the abuse of government power. The controversial
issues in substantive constitutional law involve the proper striking
of this balance. On these issues, Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence
is marked by an especially high regard for the beneficial results of
government power.
This part of the comment begins by considering three issues in
the field of criminal procedure that directly illustrate Justice
O'Connor's approach. The focus then turns to subjects that do not
so clearly reflect the same outlook: first amendment rights, where
Justice O'Connor's approach has so far remained embryonic, and
equal protection doctrine, where her one major opinion stands in
stark contrast to her usual position of deference to government
interests.
A.

Deference to Government Interests: Criminal Procedure

Justice O'Connor has written a number of opinions concerning
constitutional protections within the criminal justice process. This
section of the comment considers three subjects-privacy rights in
the law-enforcement context, the double jeopardy clause, and the
exclusionary rule-that are representative of her general approach
to these issues. This approach comprises three major elements.
First, she confines the constitutional protection to what she views
as the narrow purposes that underlie it. 20 Second, she identifies
the social costs of protecting the individual in terms of interference
with the achievement of legitimate government objectives. Third,
she often balances the importance of the individual's interest
against the costs to society in a manner that greatly curtails the
scope of the individual protection while furthering the state's ability to enforce its criminal laws. The dominant theme is her great
respect for government interests in effective law enforcement. 0 9
1. Privacy Rights and Law Enforcement. In several instances, Justice O'Connor has taken a stringent position on the extent to which protections for individual privacy and security can
be allowed to hinder the processes of law enforcement. The distinctive feature of these cases is their relation to express language
208 Her approach to first amendment issues is occasionally similar. See infra notes 25786 and accompanying text.
209 Justice O'Connor has written a few opinions that were somewhat more protective of

individual rights. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (reversing and remanding for alternative sentencing procedures); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (invalidating a criminal-loitering statute for vagueness); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reversing and remanding for alternative sentencing
procedures).
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in the fourth amendment limiting the government's power to
search and seize individual persons and property. 10 As a general
rule, Justice O'Connor has interpreted the fourth amendment in a
manner that is quite favorable to the government's interests in law
enforcement.
Justice O'Connor's exposition of the fourth amendment began
with her majority opinion in United States v. Place.2 1 1 At issue
was whether the fourth amendment prohibited warrantless
searches and seizures of personal property on a lower threshold of
suspicion of criminal activity than probable cause. Justice
O'Connor's decision expanded the circumstances under which lawenforcement authorities could undertake "reasonable" searches
and seizures without having to meet the standard of probable
cause.
In Place, the defendant had been convicted for possession of
narcotics after his motion to suppress certain evidence was denied.
The contested evidence had been obtained after the defendant was
stopped and questioned at New York's LaGuardia Airport. When
he refused consent to a search of his suitcases, the luggage was
seized and taken to Kennedy Airport, where, ninety minutes later,
it was subjected to a "sniff test" by a narcotics-detection dog. After
the test gave a positive result, the government agents obtained a
warrant to search one of the bags and found a large quantity of
cocaine."'
The Court ruled that evidence so obtained must be suppressed. Justice O'Connor's opinion held that this ninety-minute
detention of the defendant's luggage was an unreasonable seizure
of personal property under the fourth amendment. The length of
time alone made the seizure unreasonable because it constituted
too great an intrusion on the defendant's right to be secure in his
personal effects.21 3
210 Similarly, Justice O'Connor has expressed concern that the uncertain reach of individual privacy zones, which are acknowledged to be under the implied protection of the
Constitution, must not be permitted to undermine government's power to make legitimate
demands on its citizens or to take actions that benefit the public as a whole. See City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (discussed supra notes 31-49 and accompanying text); cf. Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 110-12 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (offering a narrow view of the first amendment's protection for the
privacy of one's political beliefs) (discussed infra notes 274-80 and accompanying text).
211 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).

21 Id. at 2639-40.
21S Id. at 2645-46. Justice

O'Connor also mentioned several other factors that had exacerbated the intrusiveness of this seizure, but she refused to specify the outside time limit for
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In reaching this conclusion, however, Justice O'Connor undertook a general discussion of the fourth amendment's requirements
for upholding warrantless seizures of personal property. She expressly rejected the notion that all warrantless seizures of personal
property on less than probable cause were constitutionally prohibited.21 4 Citing Terry v. Ohio2 15 for the proposition that certain limited searches may be made without probable cause, she found that
some seizures might also be so minimal as not to require probable
cause:
We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion. When the nature and extent of the detention are
minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a
seizure based on less than probable cause.2 16
She also reasoned that, in light of the "inherently transient nature
of drug courier activity at airports," the state's need to seize and
investigate luggage there outweighs a brief intrusion on fourth
217
amendment interests.
Justice O'Connor also considered whether a "sniff test" constituted a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
She found that it did not. Because the test did not involve opening
the luggage and would only indicate the presence or absence of
contraband narcotics, the defendant's privacy interests in the contents of his personal luggage, which are protected by the fourth
'218
amendment, were only minimally affected by the "sniff test.
Mirroring the thrust of the opinion as a whole, this dictum was
intended to remove uncertainty about the constitutionality of a
very effective law-enforcement technique.2 19
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion protested against the
Court's niggardly view of fourth amendment protections. He espe-

a permissible stop. Id. & n.10.
214

Id. at 2641-42.

215

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

216
217

103 S. Ct. at 2642.
Id. at 2643.

218 Id.
at 2644-45. Justices Brennan and Blackmun criticized her for reaching this issue,
which was not briefed for the Court. They also suggested other possible resolutions of the
issue. Id. at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2653 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
219 Cf. United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3307 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(suggesting a narrower view of fourth amendment privacy zones that would remove any
constitutional obstacle to certain uses of electronic beepers as aids to law enforcement).
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cially stressed the limited applicability of the Terry exception to
the probable-cause requirement. 2" Terry and its progeny had approved, on less than probable cause, a brief investigative stop of a
person coupled with a limited or "pat down" weapons search,
where the urgency of the circumstances prevent warrant procedures from being followed. 22 1 That approach is justified as helping
police officers to detect and prevent crime (the stop) and assuring
reasonable safety to the officers themselves (the search). 222 By emphasizing the law-enforcement rationale, the Court in Place was
willing to apply this exception to uphold a seizure of personal
property entirely apart from seizure of the person, where no immediate threat to anyone's safety had been alleged.223 But a seizure
of property implicates the person's fourth amendment interest in
retaining possession of personal property-an interest that is distinct from the interest in personal security and privacy implicated
by a personal stop. According to Justice Brennan, nothing in the
Terry line of cases authorized intrusion on this distinct interest,
independent of a personal stop, in the absence of probable cause.
The result, he argued, is "a radical departure from settled Fourth
Amendment principles. ' 22 4 The remoteness of this result from the
original Terry holding is apparent when one notes that seizure of a
220 103 S. Ct. at 2646-51 (Brennan, J., concurring).
221

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The investigative stop contemplated in Terry was explic-

itly approved in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972). For an ordinary application
of Terry principles, see, e.g., State v. Brooks, 127 Ariz. 130, 136, 618 P.2d 624, 630 (Ct. App.
1980) (O'Connor, J.) (denying a motion to suppress evidence obtained in an investigative
stop).
222 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22!24. The search itself was only justified under the safety rationale. Id. at 27.
22I Justice Brennan's account thus separated the initial stop of the defendant for questioning from the "independent dispossession of his personal effects." 103 S. Ct. at 2650
(Brennan, J., concurring). Certainly the two actions were much more independent here than
where a person is stopped and frisked for weapons.
...Id. at 2649. Less than one month after Place, Justice O'Connor wrote the Court's
decision in Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), provoking almost identical disagreement from Justice Brennan. The substantive issue in Long was whether a protective search
of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle, during a lawful investigatory stop of the
vehicle's occupant, was reasonable under Terry principles. The Court held that the search
was reasonable. This result was not surprising after Place, since Long was even more analogous to Terry. The central issue was simply whether the justifications offered in Terry for
frisking the suspect's person could be extended to a search of the immediate area, including
the suspect's vehicle. Emphasizing the need to assure reasonable safety to law-enforcement
officials, and the dangers present in this factual situation, Justice O'Connor found that the
need to search outweighed the invasion of the driver's privacy interests. Id. at 3478-82. But
Justice Brennan contended that "the Court takes a long step today toward 'balancing' into
oblivion the protections the Fourth Amendment affords." Id. at 3488 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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thing, independent of the stop of the person, would rarely involve
the safety 5 concerns that were an integral part of the Terry
22
rationale.
26
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Hudson v. Palmer
casts further light on her approach to search-and-seizure issues.
Here, she rejected a balancing approach in favor of a blanket authorization of prison-cell searches and seizures.
[T]he Government's compelling interest in prison safety, together with the necessarily ad hoc judgments required of
prison officials, make prison cell searches and seizures appropriate for categorical treatment. . . . The fact of arrest and
incarceration abates all legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy
and possessory interests in personal effects,. . . and therefore
all searches and seizures of the contents of an inmate's cell are
reasonable.2 27
This statement was startling because in this instance the inmate
had some personal property taken (and indeed destroyed) that was
not contraband, and the property may have been seized merely to
harass the inmate-one of the hardest imaginable situations for
the application of a blanket rule in favor of prison searches and
seizures. 228
Justice O'Connor's view of fourth amendment protections is
made quite clear by comparing her opinion in Place with her con-

225 Justice O'Connor's opinion also expanded Terry in a manner not mentioned by Jus-

tice Brennan. Terry and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), approved a seizure of a
person for purely investigative purposes; Place simply extends this reasoning to seizures of
property. This extension, however, ignores an important difference between persons and
property. The kind of investigation that police can conduct of a thing separately seized is
much more like a search than that conducted of a person incident to a Terry stop. A person
may be stopped and questioned, but he cannot be compelled during the investigation to give
information incriminating himself. Seizure of a thing, independent of the stop of the person,
is unlikely to be for any other reason than some type of quasi-search. For example, the
agents in Place seized the luggage for the purpose of subjecting it to a sniff test; although
Place concluded that the test did not constitute a search, it is actually closer to a search
than the questioning of a suspect, who can maintain silence. Thus, a detention of personal
property is a very different kind of stop than that approved in Adams. Terry balancing is
used in Place to justify a detention, the primary focus of which is not mere questioning but
a quasi-search for evidence of a crime. The result is thus a long way from the brief stop of a
person and limited weapons search in Terry, on which Justice O'Connor chiefly relied.
226 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
227 Id. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This conclusory statement expressed her
agreement with the Court's fuller analysis. See id. at 3200-02.
228 Id. at 3196-97. These circumstances prompted Justice Stevens to ask: "Is the Court
correct in its perception that 'society' is not prepared to recognize any privacy or possessory
interest of the prison inmate-no matter how remote the threat to prison security may be?"
Id. at 3208 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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currence in Hudson. In Place, she had employed a balancing approach in limiting the reach of the stringent probable cause requirement. In Hudson, however, she joined the Court in employing
exactly the opposite judicial technique. Thus, although she often
assesses criminal procedural protections by balancing state and individual interests, a balancing approach is not the core of her
fourth amendment jurisprudence. What is consistent about her approach is the great weight she gives to state interests, especially to
the demands of effectively administering a criminal justice system,
and her corresponding willingness to subordinate, at least in part,
individual claims of privacy and possessory rights.22 9
2. Double Jeopardy. Justice O'Connor's treatment of the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is marked by similar emphases and yields similar conclusions. A good example is
Thigpen v. Roberts. s° In Thigpen, the defendant had lost control
of his car and collided with a truck, killing a person in the truck.
He was convicted of four motor-vehicle misdemeanors, all of which
he appealed under the state's two-tier system for trying traffic offenses; under this system the defendant's initial conviction for the
misdemeanor charges (in a justice-of-the-peace court) would be
rendered entirely without effect on appeal, where the defendant
was entitled to a wholly new trial. While this appeal was pending,
the defendant was separately indicted and convicted on a manslaughter charge arising out of the same accident. The manslaughter conviction was later reversed by a federal court under the
double jeopardy clause. The Supreme Court, through Justice
White, affirmed that reversal on other grounds, without reaching
the double jeopardy issue.2 31
Writing in dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the Court
should have addressed the double jeopardy question and overturned the lower court's decision.23 2 Her view would have substantially narrowed the scope of the clause. She argued that no double
jeopardy problem was presented here because "jeopardy does not
229 Cf. United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3307 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)

(allowing certain uses of electronic beepers as aids to law enforcement).
230

31

104 S. Ct. 2916 (1984).

Id. at 2918-19. The Court found that the defendant's prosecution for manslaughter,

which was initiated after he asserted his right to appeal his misdemeanor convictions, raised
a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness that violated the defendant's due process
rights. Id. at 2918-20.
232 But cf. Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. 1805, 1828-30 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (habeas petition should be denied without reaching double jeopardy issue because petitioner was not in "custody").
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attach in the first tier of a 'two-tier' criminal trial."23 In this instance, the defendant had not even paid the fine imposed for his
original conviction.
This is surely dispositive evidence that [the defendant]
was never in "jeopardy" at his first-tier trial. Though he was
tried, convicted, and sentenced at that trial, he effortlessly
erased his conviction and suffered no punishment whatsoever
for the offense of reckless driving. If [the defendant] was
never in jeopardy at his first-tier trial, the second trial could
in no circumstance violate [his] constitutional right to avoid
being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense.2 34
In other words, constitutional problems did not arise merely because the defendant would be subjected to more than one trial.
The defendant must show something more, must be placed at
some substantial risk, in order to be entitled to the protection of
the double jeopardy clause.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for a divided Court in Tibbs v.
Florida23 5 also took a restrictive view of double jeopardy protections. The defendant's original conviction on charges of rape and
murder was set aside by the state supreme court for being against
the weight of the evidence, and the case was remanded for a new
trial on the same charges. The issue posed to the Supreme Court
was whether a second trial would place the defendant in double
jeopardy.
The Court ruled that the second trial was permissible. Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court distinguished a reversal of a conviction based on the weight of the evidence from a reversal of a
conviction based on insufficient evidence, which prior Court decisions had established would preclude a new trial under the double
jeopardy clause. 238 The difference, in her view, was that the reversal here "does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict.
Instead, the appellate court sits as a 'thirteenth juror' and dis2 37
agrees with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony.
This difference was significant for two reasons. First, because this
reversal was unlike an acquittal, it did not merit the special importance that the double jeopardy clause attaches to acquittals. 23 8 Sec233 Thigpen, 104 S. Ct. at 2923 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

234Id. at 2924.
235 457 U.S. 31 (1982).
236 See Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
2" 457 U.S. at 42.
238 Id. at 41-42 & n.15.
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ond, the guilty verdict and reversal indicated that the state not
only had persuaded the jury to convict, but that it had presented
what the reviewing court agreed was sufficient evidence to support
that conviction. "The reversal simply affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment"23 9 and creates no
double jeopardy problems. 4 0
In Tibbs, as in Thigpen, Justice O'Connor defined the scope of
the double jeopardy clause according to a narrow view of its purpose. In Tibbs, she ruled that a second trial would be permitted
where the first trial had not resulted in an outcome closely
equivalent to an acquittal. In Thigpen, she argued that a first trial
should not bar a second trial unless it had put the defendant at
some substantial risk. In neither case would she have spared the
defendant the trauma and potential harassment of a second
trial. 241 Thus, her approach would relax constitutional obstacles to
the prosecution of suspected criminals.
3. The Exclusionary Rule. Justice O'Connor has also supported law-enforcement interests by restricting the occasions on
which evidence will be excluded from use at trial. Although she has
adopted different justifications for this approach in different settings, all her opinions attempt to narrow the scope of the exclu-

239

Id. at 43.

240

Justice White's dissent emphatically rejected the Court's analysis. He pointed out

that if the retrial involved only the same evidence that was presented in the first trial, then
a reviewing court would again be obliged to set aside a conviction. "Thus, the only point of
any second trial in this case is to allow the State to present additional evidence to bolster its
case. If it does not have such evidence, reprosecution can serve no purpose other than harassment." Id. at 48 (White, J., dissenting). Permitting a second trial under these circumstances would directly offend "the deeply ingrained principle that 'the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense.'" Id. at 50-51 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187
(1957)). Justice White also noted that the Court's ruling might allow lower courts to evade
prior decisions barring retrial after the reversal of a conviction based on insufficient evidence. In his view, the distinction between reversals based on the weight of the evidence and
those based on insufficient evidence is often slight or even nonexistent. Thus, lower courts
would be able to permit a retrial merely by portraying the reversal as one based on the
weight of the evidence. 457 U.S. at 51 (White, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was more
sanguine about the ability of judges to distinguish the two situations. Id. at 43 & n.18, 45
(majority opinion).
241 This purpose of the double jeopardy clause is explained in Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957):
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
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sionary rule.
In Taylor v. Alabama,2 4 2 the Court ruled that the defendant's
confession, obtained through interrogation following his illegal arrest, should not have been admitted into evidence. The arrest was
illegal because it had been made without probable cause. Describing the case as "a virtual replica" of two prior Supreme Court decisions, Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court stated that the crucial issue was whether intervening events had broken the causal
connection between the illegal arrest and the confession "so that
the confession is 'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.' ,,243 He found nothing in these facts to break the
causal connection between arrest and confession, although the defendant had been allowed a very brief meeting with his girlfriend,
and Miranda warnings had been given three times. He stressed
that "[i]f Miranda warnings were viewed as a talisman that cured
all Fourth Amendment violations, then the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures would be reduced to a

mere 'form of words.'

",244

Justice O'Connor dissented. Agreeing with the Court's identification of the central issue, she argued that the causal connection
between arrest and conviction had been broken. She placed greater
weight on the repeated Miranda warnings than did the Court; she
also noted that the girlfriend's visit was permitted at the defendant's request, that no intimidating police misconduct had occurred, and that the defendant spent much of the time between his
arrest and his confession by himself. Thus, she would not have excluded the confession. 45 Although Taylor may be viewed as turning simply on a disagreement about particular facts, in two other
cases Justice O'Connor tried to carve out sizable exceptions to the
exclusionary rule.
In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza,2 " the Court considered whether the exclusionary rule applied in the context of a civil deportation hearing. The defendant,
a Mexican citizen, was arrested illegally at his place of employment
by government agents. While in the custody of the agents, he confessed to having entered the United States illegally. In a subsequent deportation hearing, he sought to have this confession sup242 457 U.S. 687 (1982).
23

14

Id. at 690 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975)).
457 U.S. at 690 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975)).

215 457 U.S. at 699-701 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
240 104 S. Ct: 3479 (1984).
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pressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest. His request was denied, and
a deportation order was entered.2 47
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply in a civil deportation hearing. Beginning
from the fact that deportation hearings require fewer protections
for the individual than do criminal hearings, s she went on to conclude that in this setting the social costs of the exclusionary rule
outweighed its ability to deter future unlawful police conduct. In
reaching that conclusion, she stressed several factors that she
thought lessened the rule's deterrence value in this context: the
nature of other readily available evidence; the rarity with which
hearings are demanded; the existence of agency provisions for deterring fourth amendment violations; and the availability of alternative remedies. 249 On the other side of the balance, the social
costs of compelling the release of those who may be unlawfully present in the country, along with the burdens that the rule would
impose on the agency's deliberately streamlined procedures, militated against imposition of the rule.250
Justice O'Connor thus found grounds for dispensing with the
rule in the narrow purpose for its creation. The purpose of exclusion is deterrence; the deterrence value in the deportation context
is low; therefore, the exclusionary rule should not be applied in the
2 51
deportation context.
Similarly, in New York v. Quarles,2 52 Justice O'Connor suggested a potentially much larger exception to the exclusionary rule,
this time as it applied to Miranda violations. As described earlier,25 3 the Court held in Quarles that the Miranda requirements
were subject to an exception where police officers asked the suspect
questions "reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety. '254 In a separate opinion, Justice O'Connor rejected the
Court's approach as an unjustified departure from precedent, but
217 Id.
248

at 3482-83.

Id. at 3484. For example, she noted that deportation hearings may proceed in the

respondent's absence and that the burdens of proof in a deportation hearing may differ
from those applied in criminal trials.
"I Id. at 3486-88. Cf. United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3307 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (strengthening standing requirements for invocation of the exclusionary rule).
"0Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3488-90.
"I The account here emphasizes the opinion's discussion of deterrence, but Justice
O'Connor also made much of the social costs of the rule: her reasoning incorporated both
factors.
251 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
'53 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
254 104 S. Ct. at 2632.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[52:389

argued that a Miranda violation did not compel the suppression of
non-testimonial evidence. She was fully aware that this position
will reduce the incentives to enforce the Miranda code. But
that fact simply begs the question of how much enforcement
is appropriate. There are some situations . . . in which the
societal cost of administering the Miranda warnings is very
high indeed. The Miranda decision quite practically does not
express any societal interest in having those warnings administered for their own sake. Rather, the warnings and waiver
are only required to ensure that "testimony" used against the
accused at trial is voluntarily given. Therefore, if the testimonial aspects of the accused's custodial communications are
suppressed, the failure to administer the Miranda warnings
2 55
should cease to be of concern.
This passage is a striking example of Justice O'Connor's approach to this area of the law and is consistent with her approach
in Lopez-Mendoza. First, she found that the scope of the exclusionary rule is confined by its underlying purpose, which she took
to be deterrence of unlawful government conduct. 256 Second, she
identified the social costs of the rule: it hampered law enforcement,
and at times it could also threaten the public safety. Third, she
balanced the protection that the rule would afford against the
harm done to society's interests, and she did so in a manner that
greatly restricted the scope of the rule and correspondingly aided
government's ability to enforce the law.
B.

Limits on the Authority to Govern: The First Amendment and
the Equal Protection Clause

Justice O'Connor's discussions of the double jeopardy clause
and the exclusionary rule show that she often seeks to avoid broad
interpretations of constitutional protections of individual rights by
limiting them in light of a narrow view of their underlying purposes. In her few statements to date about rights under the first
255 Id.
at 2638-39 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in
original) (footnote and citation omitted).
256 Actually, deterrence is not the only purpose that has been suggested for the exclu-

sionary rule. Especially in earlier cases, the "imperative of judicial integrity" was set forth
as a justification for a court's refusal to contaminate its processes with illegally obtained
evidence. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960). But subsequent
cases have relied more heavily on the deterrence rationale. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 484-86 (1976) (stating that deterrence has overtaken judicial integrity as the "primary justification" for the exclusionary rule).
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amendment and the equal protection clause, her approach seems
to be much less uniform. In some instances, she seems to approach
the constitutional provisions with an eye toward the framers' narrow purposes. But in other instances, she pays little attention to
the purposes of the constitutional provision; in these instances, she
tends to uphold the challenged government action. As the direction
of Justice O'Connor's views in these areas remains uncertain, it is
difficult to draw any definite conclusions about this aspect of her
jurisprudence.
1. First Amendment Rights. Justice O'Connor's first amendment jurisprudence has not yet taken a definite shape. Nonetheless, her few opinions in this area do reflect certain themes that are
consistent with the general thrust of her approach in other areas.
One case that exemplifies her attention to purposes is Lynch
v. Donnelly,2 57 the celebrated decision in which the Court ruled
that the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, did not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment by including a Nativity
scene in its annual public Christmas display. Both the four-Justice
plurality opinion and the four-Justice dissent applied the threeprong test for establishment clause violations that the Court had
fashioned earlier in Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 58 although the plurality
expressly declined to be confined strictly to this test.2 59 Under
Lemon, state action is valid under the establishment clause only if
the action has a secular purpose, its primary effect is neither to
advance nor inhibit religion, and it creates no excessive entanglement of government with religion. 26 0 The disagreement between
the plurality and the dissenters in Lynch was over how that test
should be applied to these particular facts.
In a separate concurrence, Justice O'Connor proposed "a clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine."2 6 Her approach
began with the purposes that she saw underlying the clause:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community. Government can
run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions. . . .The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement
257 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).

158 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
211104 S. Ct. at 1362 (plurality opinion).
20 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
261 104 S. Ct. at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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or disapproval of religion." 2
Agreeing with the plurality that no entanglement problems were
posed here, she analyzed the endorsement issue in greater detail by
"examin[ing] both what Pawtucket intended to communicate in
displaying the creche and what message the City's display actually
conveyed. '26 3 She then concluded that no endorsement could be
found on these facts. The city's purpose was merely to celebrate a
public holiday through its traditional symbols, not to endorse
Christianity. Although the scene probably had the effect of advancing religion, "the overall holiday setting changes what viewers
may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display-as a typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious content
of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of that
content.'264 Thus, no violation of the establishment clause had
occurred.
Justice O'Connor's analysis in Lynch altered the second prong
of the Lemon test. The only effect of state action that she would
have found impermissible was the communication of an endorsement or disapproval of religion, not simply any effect that advances or inhibits religion. State action could be permitted to advance or inhibit religion (indeed this might even be its principal
effect) so long as the reviewing court could not conclude that the
action actually conveyed a message endorsing or disapproving religion. In short, she had defined the purposes of the establishment
clause in a manner that limited its scope.26 5
262

Id. (citation omitted). One of the most striking aspects of her opinion, however, is

that it offered no justifications of any kind to support her understanding of the purposes of
the clause. This omission is especially surprising in light of the fact that her view of the
purposes of the clause differed from the brief accounts offered by the plurality, id. at 135859, and by Justice Brennan, id. at 1372 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For examples of more
careful analysis, see Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 583-85 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (arguing that differential taxation of the press was a
serious concern for the framers); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 78-80 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (showing that free travel among the states was originally tied to the privileges
and immunities clause).
262 104 S. Ct. at 1367 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
264 Id. at 1369 (emphasis added).
265 It is not entirely clear how much her position would alter the second prong of the
Lemon test in practice. In the more significant cases, the outcome would be the same because it would be difficult not to find "endorsement or disapproval" where a government
measure's principal effect was to advance or inhibit religion significantly. The real difference
would arise where a measure's principal effect might be to advance or inhibit religion, but
not to the extent that government endorsement or disapproval could be inferred. In Justice
O'Connor's view, Pawtucket's Nativity scene was a minor activity akin to legislative prayers,
which serve "the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing
confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation
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Again, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,2 66 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion focused on the purposes of the first amendment, but on this occasion
the challenged statute was invalidated. Minnesota had imposed a
special use tax, in lieu of the regular state sales tax, on certain
paper and ink products used to produce periodical publications.
The tax was accompanied by various exemptions so that the effect
was to burden only a handful of publishers. In fact, the complaining newspaper publisher typically paid two-thirds of the total
revenues raised by the tax.267 The Court struck down the tax as a
violation of freedom of the press.
The keystone of the Court's opinion was its attention to the
purposes underlying the first amendment's protection of the press.
Justice O'Connor candidly noted that this was not the usual judicial approach to first amendment problems because there is little
direct evidence about the amendment's purposes. "But when we do
have evidence that a particular law would have offended the Fram268
ers, we have not hesitated to invalidate it on that ground alone."
She then found, from the debates over ratification of the Bill of
Rights, considerable evidence that differential taxation of the press
was one of the specific evils that the first amendment was intended
to prevent. 26 9 The next step was to "balance the burden implicit in
singling out the press against the interest asserted by the
State. . . . [T]he regulation can survive only if the governmental
interest outweighs the burden and cannot be achieved by means
27 0°
that do not infringe First Amendment rights as significantly.
Here the state had not adequately justified the design of the tax:
"[W]e think that recognizing a power in the State not only to single out the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a
few members of the press presents such a potential for abuse'27 that
1
no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the scheme.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent vehemently disagreed with the majority's analysis. He analyzed the economic effects of the tax in an
attempt to show that this use tax, which applied to publishers in
lieu of the state sales tax, actually left even the complaining pub-

in society." Id. at 1369. Nonetheless, these supposedly inconsequential cases could well encompass most of the hard cases.
266 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
267 Id. at 578-79. The taxing statute was MINN. STAT. § 297A.02 (1982).
'" 460 U.S. at 583 n.6.
269

Id. at 583-85.

,70 Id. at 585 n.7.
2'7 Id. at 592.
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lisher better off than if the tax treatment of the press had been
more even-handed. 2 Thus, in his view, the state had not in any
way infringed on freedom of the press. In addition to disputing the
dissent's theoretical conclusions, Justice O'Connor emphatically rejected the suggestion that courts should embark on such investigations in the first amendment context. "When delicate and cherished First Amendment rights are at stake,

. . .

the constitutional

tolerance for error diminishes dramatically, and the risk increases
that courts will prove unable to apply accurately the more finely
27 3
tuned standards.

Both Lynch and Minneapolis Star reflect themes that also
run through Justice O'Connor's fourth amendment jurisprudence:
the starting point for analysis is a definition of the underlying purpose of the clause in question. But in two other opinions in the
first amendment area, Justice O'Connor failed to attend closely to
the purposes of the constitutional provision; instead, she merely
accepted the competing interests identified by other Justices and
argued that the Court had struck a balance that was too protective
of the individual's rights.
The more problematic of these examples of Justice O'Connor's
first amendment jurisprudence arose in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 4 in which the small Socialist Workers Party challenged an Ohio statute that required candidates for
political office to disclose each contributor and recipient of campaign funds.2 7 5 The Court examined the statute in light of a pri-

vacy right inferred from the first amendment-the "right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs.

' 27 6

The Court held

that no compelling state interests justified mandatory disclosure
by this minor political party and found the statute unconstitutional as applied in this instance.
2712Id. at 597-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He compared the amounts raised by the
use tax with the amounts that would have been raised by applying the sales tax, assuming
the same price and gross sales. Justice O'Connor questioned these assumptions. Id. at 590
n.14 (majority opinion).
27 Id. at 589 n.12. This statement was directed against Justice White's separate opinion, in which he concurred in the result but declined to join the Court's skepticism about
inquiries into the economic effect of particular taxes. See id. at 594-96 (White, J.,
concurring).
274 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
2176OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3517.01 to .99 (Baldwin 1972 & Supp. 1981).
276

459 U.S. at 91.

Id. at 92-93, 98-102. The Court relied heavily on its analysis in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976), in concluding that the government interests in information disclosure were
attenuated when applied to minor parties, especially when evidence suggested that the minor party had been subjected to harassment in the past.
277
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Writing in partial dissent, Justice O'Connor took issue with
the breadth of the Court's holding. She agreed with the Court that
the statute was unconstitutional as applied to require disclosure of
the minor party's contributors, but she would have upheld compulsory disclosure of the recipients of campaign expenditures. 8 She
accepted the Court,'s identification of the competing governmental
and individual interests, but disagreed with the balance struck by
the majority. In her view, the state interests in preventing improper electoral conduct remained strong when the statute was applied to minor parties. 2 79 She also argued that disclosure
threatened the associational rights of recipients less than it
threatened the rights of contributors: unlike contributors, who express their political views by the very act of contribution, recipients tend to be either ordinary businesses or active campaigners,
and in neither instance is the privacy of their political beliefs likely
to be threatened by disclosure. 8 °
The difficulty with this approach is that it may underemphasize the nature of the speech at stake in Brown. The threat
here was to political speech, which is essential to the preservation
of healthy democratic institutions, and which is undeniably the
kind of speech that the first amendment was primarily intended to
protect. Yet Justice O'Connor eschewed any reference to the underlying purpose of the first amendment.
Similarly, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,2 81 she disagreed with the Court's implementation of the applicable standard
without tying her approach to first amendment purposes. In Roberts, the Court held that a Minnesota Human Rights Department
order that the Jaycees admit women to its state chapters did not
abridge any associational rights possessed by Jaycee members. In
particular, the Court held that the state's compelling interest in
eradicating gender discrimination justified any impact that the order might have on the members' freedom of expressive association.2 8 2
Although concurring in most of the Court's opinion, Justice

278

27,

459 U.S. at 107 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
More specifically, she argued that minor parties were not less likely to engage in

corrupt practices merely because they were unlikely to win the election and that any resulting deflection of votes could still determine the outcome of the election among the other
candidates. Id. at 109-10 & nn.4-6. The Court's opinion expressly denied the importance of
these points. Id. at 95 & n.11.
:so Id. at 110-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
281 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
2 Id. at 3252-55.
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O'Connor disagreed with this statement of the test for judging infringement of expressive association. First, she feared that requiring a showing of a compelling state interest might allow some commercial associations to use the first amendment as a shield to gain
protection for discrimination by occasionally engaging in expressive activities. 283 Second, the Court's hasty application of the compelling-state-interest test neglected to establish at the outset that
the Jaycees merited the strong protections afforded to expressive
associations. She then offered her own standard:
In my view, an association should be characterized as
commercial, and therefore subject to rationally related state
regulation of its membership and other associational activities, when, and only when, the association's activities are not
predominantly of the type protected by the First Amendment.
It is only when the association is predominantly engaged in
protected expression that state regulation of its membership
will necessarily affect, change, dilute, or silence one collective
voice that would otherwise be heard. An association must
choose its market. Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete control
over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas. 8 4
She recognized that assessing "predominance" might be difficult in
some instances. But she had little difficulty concluding that the
Jaycees were predominantly a commercial association and thus
could be subjected to rational state regulation. 8 5 The larger significance of her test, however, lay in its broad rejection of first amendment protection for the associational rights of organizations that
26
undertake any substantial amount of commercial activity.
283 Id. at 3257-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She was especially concerned about how
the Court would rule in a situation where it found that the admission of women to an organization, especially to a highly discriminatory organization, "would affect the content of the
organization's message." Id. at 3258. Her emphasis on defending the state's power "to pursue the profoundly important goal of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to commercial opportunities in our society," id. at 3257, bears comparison with her majority opinion in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), which ruled that the same
"profoundly important goal" might also justify serious restraints on state power. For a discussion of Hogan, see infra notes 287-92 and accompanying text.
284 104 S. Ct. at 3259 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
285

Id. at 3261.

Justice O'Connor has not yet expressed specific views on the protections afforded to
various forms of speech, but in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), where the Court
upheld a statute outlawing child pornography, her brief concurring opinion suggested that
"the Constitution might in fact permit [states] to ban knowing distribution of works depict286
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2. Equal Protection.Justice O'Connor's one major opinion in
the equal protection area sheds little light on her approach to this
constitutional provision. Writing for a bare majority of the Court,
Justice O'Connor ruled in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan2 87 that the single-sex admissions policy of a state-run nursing school, which \excluded men, violated the equal protection
clause. Her legal analysis was straightforward. Adhering closely to
the language of prior cases, she decided that the proper standard
for reviewing this admissions policy, which openly discriminated
against individuals on the basis of gender, was whether the state's
objective was "legitimate and important," and whether a "direct,
substantial relationship between objective and means is present";
this standard is meant to ensure "that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than through
the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women. 'B88 She
found that the state's policy failed to meet either prong of this
test.
The alleged state objective was to compensate for past discrimination against women. Justice O'Connor undertook a "searching analysis" of this justification2 8 9 and found it to be unpersuasive. Mississippi had made no showing that women lacked
opportunities for training in the field of nursing; on the contrary,
women were already earning practically all the nursing degrees
conferred, both within the state and nationwide. Thus, not only
did this single-sex admissions policy not benefit women by compensating for any past discrimination, but it even "tend[ed] to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's
29 0
job."
Justice O'Connor also concluded that this restrictive admissions policy bore no direct or substantial relationship to the state's
proposed objective. Men were allowed to audit and to participate
fully in the nursing school's classes, and the trial record showed
that excluding men from full admission did not advance any particular educational goals. Thus, even if the discriminatory policy

ing minors engaged in explicit sexual conduct, regardless of the social value of the depictions," id. at 774 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This statement suggests that she may adhere to
a fairly narrow view of the kinds of speech that are protected by the first amendment.
37 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
188 Id.
at 725-26.
18 Id. at 728.
,9 Id. at 729. According to the Court, women were earning over 90% of all baccalaureate nursing degrees, both within the state and across the country. Id.
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did benefit women, that benefit was indefensible because it did not
contribute to the overall goals of this program.29 '
It would be improvident to infer much about Justice
O'Connor's views of the equal protection clause from this one case.
Nevertheless, Hogan suggests that she may have a special concern
for protection of individuals against state action in the gender discrimination context. One could interpret her opinion in Roberts v.
United States Jaycees2 92 as a reflection of this same special concern, though the inference would be weaker in that case. Taken
together, Hogan and Roberts might be the early work of a Justice
committed to furthering equality of the sexes, even when that commitment does not mesh easily with other aspects of her jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION

The emerging jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor is marked by
its general consistency over a broad range of subjects. The dominant themes are respect for the powers and responsibilities exercised by the political branches of the government and a corre291

Id. at 730-31. Justice Powell's dissent sheds interesting light on a federalism ap-

proach that Justice O'Connor could have employed to reach a different result. He argued

that the Court's decision would produce an unnecessarily broad conformity by rejecting the
state's efforts "to provide women with a traditionally popular and respected choice of educational environment." Id. at 735 (Powell, J., dissenting). But she rejected the view that the
state's goal of preserving diversity in educational environments could save this discriminatory policy. Id. at 731 n.17 (majority opinion). Her refusal to countenance this argument
suggests a view that the equal protection clause cannot be overridden by the assertion of
directly incompatible state interests. In light of her usual views on federalism, see supra
notes 138-205 and accompanying text, this would indicate a fairly firm view of equal protection rights, at least in the gender context.
2.92 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984) (discussed supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text); cf.
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3237-38 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (construing Title VI to redress nothing more than purposeful discrimination, but
suggesting that she would have construed the statute differently had a majority of the Court
not already ruled on the issue in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
Moreover, in Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982), Justice O'Connor also took a generous
view of equal protection rights. Although the case did not involve a gender-based classification, the concerns were not entirely dissimilar. The Court used the equal protection clause
to invalidate a Texas statute barring paternity suits brought on behalf of illegitimate children more than one year after their birth. Id. at 101. In a separate opinion, Justice
O'Connor called into question the state's new four-year limitations period on these actions,
enacted after this suit had been brought. She noted that this cause of action was one of very
few Texas actions not tolled during the plaintiff's minority, id. at 104 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and that the risk "that the child will find himself without financial support from his
natural father seems as likely throughout his minority as during the first year of his life," id.
at 106. Thus, she argued that the Court's opinion had not prejudged the constitutionality of
longer alternative limitation periods for paternity actions.

1985]

The Jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor

sponding concern that courts should be cautious in obstructing the
power to govern. In ordinary parlance, these positions represent a
fairly "conservative" jurisprudence. The consistency of Justice
O'Connor's approach could thus help to sharpen the debate over
the propriety of this approach, a debate that will undoubtedly influence future trends in what is now an ideologically divided Court.
One of Justice O'Connor's primary goals is to fashion a more
modest role for the courts. Firmly believing in the governmental
system of separated powers, she seems unwilling to have the judiciary seek to serve as the ultimate authority among the coordinate
branches. 93 Indeed, she is extremely deferential to executive and
legislative actions, apparently on the ground that the judicial
branch alone lacks a direct political tie to the sovereign power of
the people. Both views are defensible but are also very much open
to debate. The former position perhaps oversimplifies the nature of
the judicial role in the American constitutional system: to the extent that a vigorous judiciary is necessary to preserve a proper balance among the branches of government, strong mediating powers
are in order for the courts. 9 4, The latter position may also rest on a
mistaken view of American politics, which is not simply a democratic politics, but democracy tempered with a strong suspicion of
concentrated power. American government combines the principle
of majority rule with protection for minority rights; democracy is
restrained by the rule of law, and the courts are an important
guardian against the dangers of majority tyranny that were so
feared by the nation's founders. Nonetheless, on the side of Justice
O'Connor's approach is the simple but cogent observation that the
judiciary may at some point simply go too far in asserting its expansive powers, and the specter of majority tyranny may give way
to the reality of judicial tyranny.
Justice O'Connor's view of federalism also raises significant
questions about the system of government. Her view rests on what
she sees as the logical implications of statehood: the federal and
state governments share in a partnership, with each drawing its
legitimacy from the fundamental sovereign power that resides in
the people. Although the federal government enjoys a superior sta293

See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984) (discussed supra notes 84-105 and

accompanying text); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 465 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussed supra notes 31-48 and accompanying
text); ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 331 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (discussed supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text).
211 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78 & 80 (A. Hamilton); Levi, The Sovereignty of the
Courts, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 passim (1983).
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tus in this partnership, its powers are at least subject to minimal
procedural restraints that protect the mechanisms of state government against overly intrusive uses of federal powers.""' The logic of
this view is sound, but it is open to at least two practical criticisms.
First, it tends to play down the fundamental alteration in the federal system brought about by the CiVil War and the subsequent
constitutional amendments. 96 Second, because her approach so far
has been almost purely procedural, it is inadequate to restore any
real political power to the states. Indeed, by stifling "intrusive" efforts by the federal government to design measures that will involve the states in "cooperative federalism," her approach might
simply provoke more direct assertions of broad federal powers.
Justice O'Connor's positions on certain other substantive constitutional issues are probably her most controversial. She often
takes a limited view of constitutionally protected individual rights:
she tends to interpret these protections narrowly, according to a
strict view of their original purposes, and thus seeks to bolster
democratic power against the impediments raised by extensive judicial activity. Although on occasion she has come down on the
side of broad first amendment and equal protection rights, her
usual approach is deferential to government interests, especially
the interest in effective law enforcement. 9 7 But one may doubt
whether it is appropriate to confine constitutional provisions
within the narrow purposes that the framers may have had in
mind. Perhaps these provisions should be interpreted generously
because they reflect important values intended to guide the American experiment in self-government in unforeseen circumstances.
And one important "state interest" is maintaining a government,
of which the federal judiciary is a critical element, that diligently
seeks to limit its own power by defending these values.
295 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983) (discussed supra notes 193-205

and accompanying text); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
775 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussed supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text).
296 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976). Alexander Hamilton
pointed out that "an augmentation of federal authority without a diminution of State authority [or] sovereignty in the Union and complete independence in the members [represents] the political monster of an imperium in imperio." THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 108 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The most troublesome theoretical problem with federalism
is to ascertain how much "diminution" of state authority is required.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983) (discussed supra notes 21125 and accompanying text); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416, 465 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussed supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text). But see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (discussed supra notes 287-92 and accompanying text).
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Finally, Justice O'Connor's opinions shed light on the paradox
of "conservative" judicial activism. It is sometimes suggested that
conservative Justices should not overturn established doctrines because they are obliged by their own philosophy to "conserve" the
existing law. This view misconceives the nature of the judicial
function. Justice O Connor takes seriously the limitations imposed
by ordinary notions of judicial restraint, but she has not looked for
the answer to every important question in exact adherence to precedent.2 98 Much of the law, and especially constitutional law, which
is built upon an authoritative document that "must be enormously
ambiguous in its general provisions, "299 is simply too broad and
fluid to doom a conservative judge to the status of a cipher.
Richard A. Cordray
James T. Vradelis

2" See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2634 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussed supra notes 11-30 and accompanying text);
United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983) (discussed supra notes 211-25 and accompanying text); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982) (discussed supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text).
"I E. LEVi, supra note 28, at 59. See generally id. at 57-102 (examining the nature of
constitutional interpretation).

